Search, matching and training by Flinn, Christopher et al.
Search, Matching and Training
Christopher Flinn
New York University
Collegio Carlo Alberto
Ahu Gemici
Royal Holloway, U. of London
Steven Laufer∗
Federal Reserve Board
October 31, 2016
Abstract
We estimate a partial and general equilibrium search model in which firms and workers
choose how much time to invest in both general and match-specific human capital. To
help identify the model parameters, we use NLSY data on worker training and we
match moments that relate the incidence and timing of observed training episodes to
outcomes such as wage growth and job-to-job transitions. We use our model to offer
a novel interpretation of standard Mincer wage regressions in terms of search frictions
and returns to training. Finally, we show how a minimum wage can reduce training
opportunities and decrease the amount of human capital in the economy.
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1 Introduction
There is a long history of interest in human capital investment, both before and after
entry into the labor market. In the latter case, it is common to speak of general and
specific human capital, which are differentiated in terms of their productivity-enhancing
effects across jobs (which may be defined by occupations, industries, or firms). The
classic analysis of Becker (1964) considered these types of investments in competitive
markets and concluded that workers should pay the full costs of general training, with
the costs of specific training (that increases productivity only at the current employer)
being shared in some way. Analysis of these investments in a noncompetitive setting is
more recent. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) consider how the predictions of the amount
and type of human capital investment in a competitive labor market are altered when
there exist market imperfections in the form of search frictions. Frictions create an
imperfect “lock in” between a worker and the firm, so that increases in general or
specific human capital are generally borne by both the worker and the firm.
We introduce training decisions into what is otherwise a reasonably standard search
model with general and specific human capital. The training data we use to estimate
the model, described briefly below, indicate that formal training is reported by a not
insignificant share of workers, and that the likelihood of receiving training is a function
of worker characteristics, in particular, education. Workers do not receive training only
at the beginning of job spells, although the likelihood of receiving training is typically
a declining function of tenure. Since training influences the likelihood of termination of
the job and wages, it is important to examine training decisions in a relatively complete
model of worker-firm employment relationships.
One motivation for this research is related to recent observations regarding shifts in
the Beveridge curve, which is the relationship between job vacancies and job searchers.
While the unemployment rate in the U.S. has been markedly higher from 2008 and
beyond,1 reported vacancies remain high. This mismatch phenomenon has been in-
vestigated through a variety of modeling frameworks (see, e.g., Cairo (2013) and Lin-
denlaub (2013)), typically by allowing some shift in the demand for workers’ skills. In
our modeling framework, such a shift could be viewed as a downward movement in the
distribution of initial match productivities. Given the absence of individuals with the
desired skill sets, the obvious question is why workers and firms do not engage in on-
the-job investment so as to mitigate the mismatch in endowments. Using our model,
we can theoretically and empirically investigate the degree to which a decentralized
labor market with search frictions is able to offset deterioration in the initial match
productivity distribution.
Another motivation for our research is to provide a richer model of the path of wages
on the job and a more complete view of the relationship between workers and firms.
1Although the unemployment rate has declined recently, the employment rate in the population is at a
historic low. Many of those counted as out of the labor force are in fact willing to take a “reasonable” job
offer, and hence should be considered to be “unemployed” in the true sense of the term.
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In this model, firms offer workers the opportunity to make mutually advantageous
investments in the worker’s skills, both of the general and specific (to the job) type.
While investing, the worker devotes less time to productive activities, which is the only
cost of investment that we include in the model.2 Wage changes over the course of the
employment spell are produced by changes in general skill levels, changes in specific
skill levels, and changes in investment time. In models that include on-the-job search
possibilities, which is the case for ours, wages during an employment spell may also
increase due to the presence of another firm bidding for the employee’s services, as
in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Dey and Flinn (2005), and Cahuc et al. (2006).
When there exists the potential for other firms to “poach” the worker from her current
firm, investments in match-specific skills will be particularly attractive to the current
employer, since high levels of match-specific skills will make it less likely that the
worker will exit the firm for one in which her initial match-specific skill level is higher.
Other things equal, these differences in the retention value component of specific-skill
investment implies that firms will reduce the employee’s wage less for a given level of
specific-skill investment than for general skill investment.
In our modelling framework, the complementarity between general and specific
human capital gives firms an incentive to partially finance improvements in general
ability. Specifically, the flow productivity of a match is given by y(a, θ) = aθ, where
a is the general ability of the worker, and θ is match productivity. The gain in flow
productivity from a small change in a is simply θ and the gain in flow productivity
from a small change in θ is simply a. Jobs for which a is relatively high in comparison
to θ will experience bigger productivity gains from investment in θ and conversely for
job matches in which a is relatively low in comparison with θ. Thus, strictly from
the productivity standpoint, there will be an incentive to “balance” a and θ in the
investment process. This, coupled with the fact that there exist search frictions, will
lead firms to be willing to finance part of the investment in general human capital,
even if this does not change the expected duration of the match.
We believe that our modeling framework may be useful in understanding the link
between initial labor market endowments and earnings inequality over the labor mar-
ket career. Flinn and Mullins (2015) estimated a model with an identical specification
for flow productivity as the one employed here and examined the pre-market entry
schooling decision. In their model, initial ability endowments were altered by school-
ing decisions, and these decisions were a function of all of the primitive parameters
characterizing the labor market. In their setting, a was fixed over the labor market
career and a match draw at a firm was also fixed over the duration of the job spell. In
2That is, the only costs of investing in either of the skills is the lost output associated with the investment
time. Moreover, we will assume that these costs are the same for either type of investment. There are no
direct costs of investment as in Wasmer (2006), for example. In his case, all investment in skills occurs
instantaneously at the beginning of a job spell. Lentz and Roys (2015), instead, assume that general and
match-specific skills are binary, and that for a low-type worker on either dimension the cost of training is a
flow cost that is increasing in the rate at which the transition to the high skill type occurs. Depreciation in
skills is not considered in either paper.
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the case of our model, both a and θ are subject to (endogenous and exogenous) change,
although it may well be that a is more difficult and costly to change after labor market
entry. This is due to the fact that employers are not equipped to offer general learning
experiences as efficiently as are schools that specialize in increasing the cognitive and
noncognitive abilities of their students. To the extent that a is essentially fixed over
the labor market career, individuals with large a endowments will be more attractive
candidates for investment in match-specific skills than will individuals with low values
of a. Even if initial values of θ are drawn from the same distribution for all a types,
which is the assumption that we make below, higher values of a at the time of labor
market entry could lead to more investments and a more rapidly increasing wage pro-
file over the course of an employment spell. This offers a mechanism to amplify the
differences in earnings generated by the initial variability in a.
Using estimates from the model, it is possible to examine the impact of various
types of labor market policies on investment in the two types of human capital. For
example, Flinn and Mullins (2015) investigated the impact of minimum wage laws on
pre-market investment. They found that for relatively low (yet binding for some low
a workers) minimum wage levels, the minimum wage could be a disincentive for pre-
market investment, since similar wage rates could be obtained without costly education.
At higher levels of the minimum wage, however, most individuals invested in a to
increase their probability of finding a job. For firms to earn nonnegative profit flows
in that model, productivity has to be at least aθ ≥ m, where m is the minimum
wage. For high values of m, workers will invest in general ability to increase their
level of a so as to increase the likelihood of generating a flow productivity level that
satisfies the firm’s nonnegative flow profit condition. In our framework of post-entry
investment, the impact of minimum wages is also ambiguous. As in the standard Becker
story for competitive labor markets, a high minimum wage will discourage investment
activity if the firm is to achieve nonnegative flow profits. On the other hand, through
investment activity that raises the individual’s productivity (through a and/or θ), the
firm and worker can act to make the constraint nonbinding by pushing the individual’s
productivity into a region for which w > m. These possibilities may mitigate the need
to increase pre-market entry investment in a.
In terms of related research, the closest paper to ours is probably Wasmer (2006).
He presents a formal analysis of the human capital investment problem after market
entry in a framework with search frictions and firing costs. His model is stylized, as is
the one we develop below, and is not taken to data. He assumes that human capital
investments, be it of the general or specific kind, are made as soon as the employment
relationship between a worker and a firm begins. Investment does not explicitly involve
time or learning by doing, which we believe to be an important part of learning on the
job. However, due to the simplicity of the investment technology, Wasmer is able to
characterize worker and firm behavior in a general equilibrium setting, and he provides
elegant characterizations of the states of the economy in which workers and firms will
choose only general, only specific, or both kinds of human capital investment. One of
the goals of our paper is to estimate both partial and general equilibrium versions of
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this type of model with what we think may be a slightly more realistic form of the
human capital production technology, one in which time plays the central role.
Another related paper is Bagger et al. (2014). This paper examines wage and
employment dynamics in a discrete-time model with deterministic growth in general
human capital in the number of years of labor market experience. There is no match-
specific heterogeneity in productivity, but the authors do allow for the existence of
firm and worker time-invariant heterogeneity. There is complementarity between the
worker’s skill level and the productivity level of the firm, so that it would be opti-
mal to reallocate more experienced workers to better firms. The authors allow for
renegotiation of wage contracts between workers and firms when an employed worker
meets an alternative employer, and, due to the generality of human capital, the more
productive firm always wins this competition. The model is estimated using Danish
employer-employee matched data. Key distinctions between our approach and the one
taken in that paper are the lack of firm heterogeneity but the presence of worker-firm
match heterogeneity, the value of which can be changed by the investment decisions
of the worker-firm pair. This paper also allows for worker heterogeneity that is an
endogenous stochastic process partially determined through the investment decisions
of workers and firms.
Lentz and Roys (2015) also examine general and specific human capital accumula-
tion in a model that features worker-firm renegotation and the ability of firms to make
lifetime welfare promises to workers in the bargaining stage. There is firm heterogene-
ity in productivity, and the authors find that better firms provide more training. The
nature of the contracts offered to workers is more sophisticated than the ones consid-
ered here, and the authors explicitly address the issue of inefficiencies in the training
and mobility process. They assume that there are only four training states in the
economy (an individual can be high or low skill in general and specific productivity),
which greatly aids in the theoretical analysis at the cost of not being able to generate
wage and employment sample paths that can fit patterns observed at the individual
level. They also assume that there is no skill depreciation, which serves to simplify the
theoretical analysis of the model.
The model that we develop and estimate below has several notable features. As
mentioned above, it endogenizes the general-productivity level of the individual and the
match-productivity level of the worker-firm pair using a cooperative model of worker-
firm interactions. In most of the literature on worker-firm sorting (e.g., Abowd et al.
(1999), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Cahuc et al. (2006)), match productivity is
ignored and worker and firm types are assumed to be time-invariant. The focus of
much of this literature is on worker-firm sorting patterns. Within our framework, it is
clear that the total productivity of an employee at a particular firm is a fluid object,
with “mismatches” being potentially rectified through cooperative investment choices
by the worker and firm. Viewing the productivity of a worker at a given firm as an
endogenous stochastic process is an important point of differentiation of our model
from most of the literature.
The fact that productivity can be altered forces us to reconsider the usual con-
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straints on firm hiring that are implied by models without endogenous productivity.
When productivity is fixed, then for firms to at least break even on the employment
contract, the flow profit of a firm should be non-negative. However, when productiv-
ity can be increased through investment, it is possible (and occurs given our model
estimates) that firms could earn negative flow profits for some part of the employment
contract. This is an especially important consideration when evaluating the impact of
policies such as a mandated minimum wage. In Flinn (2006), for instance, establishing
a binding minimum wage of m in a market (in which there was not one previously)
immediately caused the loss of all jobs for which the worker’s flow productivity was
less than m. With endogenous productivity, this may no longer be the case, since,
through investment, the worker’s productivity could be raised sufficiently so that the
firm earns positive flow profits. The extent to which this phenomenon occurs is an
empirical matter, which we can investigate using our model estimates.
Another literature to which this paper contributes is that concerned with the de-
composition of the sources of wage growth over the life cycle, a literature the genesis of
which traces back at least to Mincer, whose work on wage determination is summarized
in Mincer (1974). While much of the work in this literature focuses on the estimation
of the return to schooling,3 our contribution is to the interpretation of the part of the
earnings process associated with the worker’s total labor market experience and tenure
on their current job. The model generates positive dependencies between the duration
of time in the market and at the current job with wages since both duration measures
are positively related to the values of general and match-specific human capital. As
individuals age, there is a tendency for general human capital, a, to increase. Also, be-
cause the turnover decision is determined through the comparison between the match
productivity value θ at the current firm, with the initial match productivity draw θ′ at
the competing firm, longer employment durations at the firm indicate higher current
values of match productivity. Even though the Mincer earnings function is largely
an atheoretical construct, it is of interest to determine the extent to which the data
generating process associated with our model produces relationships between wages,
schooling, general experience, and job tenure broadly consistent with what would be
found when estimating a Mincerian wage function using data from our sample. We
find that, by and large, the wage functions estimated using the sample and those us-
ing simulated data from the model are roughly in agreement, even though the sample
regression was not used in estimating the model parameters. This gives us some con-
fidence that the model estimated does not generate empirical implications at variance
with the results in literature focused on the estimation and interpretation of Mincerian
earnings functions.
The model estimates we present are obtained using data from the 1997 cohort of
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97), which consists of individuals
between the ages of 12-16 at the end of 1997. The advantage of using these data are
3Heckman et al. (2006) present a comprehensive consideration of the estimation of Mincer-type earnings
functions, although their main focus is on the consistent estimation of rates of return to schooling.
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that we can observe individuals from the beginning of their labor market careers, which
minimizes initial conditions problems. Moreover, it is well-known that job changing
behavior and wage growth are more pronounced at the onset of the labor market career.
One negative aspect of estimating the model using only relatively recent labor market
entrants is that we are likely to get predictions for later career events that are at odds
with the data. This also implies that the steady state distributions implied by the
model should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. Our future research plan is
to extend the model to include endogenous pre-market entry schooling decisions and
to estimate the model using samples with a larger range of ages and participation
histories.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we analyze a partial equilibrium
search model with general and specific human capital and subsequently extend it to
a general equilibrium framework. Section 3 discusses the data used in the estimation
of the model, and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses econometric is-
sues such as the model specification used in our estimation, the estimator we use, and
identification. In Section 5, we present the estimation results and discuss the details
of the estimated model, such as parameter estimates, model fit, and policy rules. Sec-
tion 5 also presents a discussion regarding the implications of our estimated model for
sources of wage growth and provides a novel perspective on the interpretation of the
standard Mincer wage regression. In Section 6, we conduct a minimum wage experi-
ment to determine the impact of minimum wages on general and specific human capital
investment decisions, in a partial as well as general equilibrium framework. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Modeling Framework
Individuals are characterized in terms of a (general) ability level a, with which they
enter the labor market.4 There are M values of ability, given by
0 < a1 < ... < aM <∞.
When an individual of type ai encounters a firm, he draws a value of θ from the discrete
distribution G over the K values of match productivity θ, which are given by
0 < θ1 < ... < θK <∞.
We denote the c.d.f. of θ by G, and we define pj = Pr(θ = θj), j = 1, ...,K. The flow
4Flinn and Mullins (2015) examine pre-market entry education decisions in a search environment in
which a hold-up problem exists. We will not explicitly model the pre-market entry schooling decision, but
will merely assume that the distribution of an individual’s initial value of a at the time of market entry is
a stochastic function of their completed schooling level. In estimation, we will distinguish three schooling
levels.
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productivity value of the match is assumed to be given by the following production
technology5
y(i, j) = aiθj .
We consider the case in which both general ability and match productivity can be
changed through investment on the job. The investment level, along with the wage,
are determined cooperatively in the model using a surplus division rule. At every
moment of time, the individual and firm can devote an amount of time τa to training
in general ability, in the hope of increasing a from its current level. Similarly, they
can invest an amount of time τθ in match-specific training, in the hope of increasing θ
from its current level. We normalize the allocatable amount of time at each moment
to unity, so that the flow amount of time actually working and producing output is
1− τa − τθ.
Through time investment decisions made cooperatively by the worker and firm,
both a and θ can be improved whenever neither is currently at its maximum possible
value. If the current state of a is ai, with i < M, then the rate of improvement to the
next level, ai+1, is given by
ϕa(i, τa)
with ϕa(i, τa) ≥ 0 for i < M, and ϕa(i, 0) = 0. In terms of match-specific ability, given
the current state θj , j < K, the rate of improvement to the next level, θj+1, is given
by
ϕθ(j, τθ),
with ϕθ(j, τθ) ≥ 0 for j < K, and ϕθ(j, 0) = 0. We have assumed that these growth
processes are independent, in the sense that the rate of improvement in a depends only
on its current level ai and the amount of time spent investing in a, τa. The same is
true for the growth process in θ, where the rate of improvement depends only on the
current level of match-specific productivity, θj , and the amount of time spent investing
in it, τθ. These restrictions are made in acknowledgment of the severe difficulties we
face in credibly identifying model parameters, given that the levels of both types of
human capital and the time spent investing are essentially unobservable to us. Strong
functional form assumptions are required to identify our parsimoniously-parameterized
model.
For purposes of estimation, we further restrict the function ϕa to have the form
ϕa(i, τa) = ϕ
0
a(i)ϕ
1
a(τa),
where ϕ1a is strictly concave in τa, with ϕ
1
a(0) = 0. The term ϕ
0
a(i) can be thought of as
5The assumption of strong complementary between two types of skills is often made in the matching
literature, but this application is somewhat different. In the search and matching literature, it is often
assumed that the productivity of an individual-firm match is the product of the two productivity values
(e.g., Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002), primarily to simplify the estimation problem. While we could, in
principle, allow the flow productivity to be some function f(a,), this would create an even more challenging
identification problem than we already face, since its two arguments are both unobserved by us.
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total factor productivity (TFP) in a sense, and we place no restriction on whether ϕ0a(i)
is increasing or decreasing in i, although the functional form we utilize in estimation
will restrict this function to be monotone.6 Since there is no hope of increasing the
level of a beyond its maximum value of αM , there will be no investment in a when
a = aM .
There is an exactly analogous production technology for increasing match-specific
productivity, with the rate of increase from match value j to match value j + 1 given
by
ϕθ(j, τθ) = ϕ
0
θ(j)ϕ
1
θ(τθ),
with ϕ1θ strictly concave in τθ, and ϕ
1
θ(0) = 0. There is no necessary restriction on the
TFP terms, as above. As was true in the case of a, if match productivity is at its
highest level, θK , then τθ = 0.
We allow for depreciation of skills in the following way. Whenever an individual has
a general ability level greater than the minimum value of a1, he is subject to Poisson
shocks that arrive at exogenous rate δa. When such a shock arrives, an individual with
a general ability level of ai has their skill level reduced to ai−1. For convenience in
writing the Bellman equations below, we define δ˜a(i) = δa for i > 1, and δ˜a(1) = 0.
The same assumptions are applied to the match-specific skill process, with the rate of
depreciation from a value θj to θj−1 equal to δθ for all j > 1. We define δ˜θ(j) = δθ for
j > 1, and δ˜θ(1) = 0.
The only costs of either type of training are foregone productivity, with total pro-
ductivity given by (1− τa− τθ)y(i, j). The gain from an improvement in either accrues
to both the worker and firm, although obviously, gains in general human capital in-
crease the future value of labor market participation (outside of the current job spell)
to the individual only. As noted by Wasmer (2006), this means that the individual’s
bargaining position in the current match is impacted by a change in a to a greater
extent than it is due to a change in θ. Motives for investment in the two different types
of human capital depend importantly on the worker’s surplus share parameter α, but
also on all other primitive parameters characterizing the labor market environment.
2.1 No On-the-Job Search
We first consider the case of no on-the-job search in order to fix ideas. In defining
surplus, we use as the outside option of the worker the value of continued search in the
unemployment state, given by VU (i), and for the firm, we will assume that the value
of an unfilled vacancy is 0, produced through the standard free entry condition (FEC).
6By this we mean that either
ϕ0a(1) ≤ ϕ0a(2) ≤ ... ≤ ϕ0a(M)
or
ϕ0a(1) ≥ ϕ0a(2) ≥ ... ≥ ϕ0a(M).
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We can write the problem as
max
w,τa,τθ
(
V˜E(i, j;w, τa, τθ)− VU (i)
)α
V˜F (i, j;w, τa, τθ)
1−α,
where the V˜E and V˜F functions are the value of employment to the worker and to the
firm, respectively, given the wage and investment times.
We first consider the unemployment state. We will assume that the flow value of
unemployment to an individual of type ai is proportional to ai, or bai, i = 1, ...,M,
where b is a scalar parameter. The value of unemployed search can be written as
VU (i) =
bai + λU
∑K
j=r∗(i) pjVE(i, j)
ρ+λU G˜(θr∗(i))
, (1)
where λU is the rate of arrival of potential employment opportunities to the individual.
The discount rate ρ is the sum of the subjective discount rate of the individual, ρ0, and
a constant death rate of `, so that ρ = ρ0 + `.
7 It is assumed that the value associated
with the state of death is 0. The critical (index) value r∗(i) is defined by
VU (i) ≥ VE(i, θr∗(i))
VU (i) < VE(i, θr∗(i)+1).
An agent of general ability ai will reject any match values of θr∗(i) or less, and accept
any match values greater than this.8
Given a wage of w and a training level of τa and τθ, the value of employment of
type ai at a match of θj is
V˜E(i, j;w, τa, τθ) = (ρ+ ϕa(i, τa) + ϕθ(j, τθ) + δ˜a(i) + δ˜θ(j) + η)
−1
×[w + ϕa(i, τa)Q(i+ 1, j) + ϕθ(j, τθ)VE(i, j + 1) + δ˜a(i)Q(i− 1, j)
+δ˜θ(j)Q(i, j − 1) + ηVU (ai)],
where δ˜k(i) = 0 if i = 1 and δ˜k(i) = δk if i > 1, for k = a, θ. The term
Q(i, j) ≡ max[VE(i, j), VU (i)],
allows for the possibility that a reduction in the value of a or θ could lead to an
endogenous termination of the employment contract, with the employee returning to
the unemployment state. It also allows for the possibility that an increase in a from ai
7The death rate is introduced so as to produce more reasonable steady state distributions than the ones
we generated using model estimates and an assumption that ` = 0. Less dramatically, we can think of
this state as corresponding to retirement, but it should be borne in mind that we assign the value of this
absorbing state to be 0.
8Note that we assume that there are no shocks to the individuals’ ability level during unemployment.
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to ai+1 could lead to an endogenous separation. This could occur if the reservation θ,
r∗(i), is increasing in i. In this case, an individual employed at the minimally acceptable
match r∗(i) + 1, may quit if a improves and r∗(i+ 1) ≥ r∗(i) + 1.
The corresponding value to the firm is
V˜F (i, j;w, τa, τθ) = (ρ+ ϕa(i, τa) + ϕθ(j, τθ) + δ˜a(i) + δ˜θ(j) + η)
−1
× [(1− τa − τθ)y(i, j)− w + ϕa(i, τa)QF (i+ 1, j) + ϕθ(j, τθ)VF (i, j + 1)
+δ˜aQF (i− 1, j) + δ˜θQF (i, j − 1)
]
where QF (i, j) = 0 if Q(i, j) = VU (i) and QF (i, j) = VF (i, j) if Q(i, j) = VE(i, j).
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Then the solution to the surplus division problem is given by
{w∗(i, j), τ∗a (i, j), τ∗θ (i, j)} = arg maxw,τa,τθ
(
V˜E(i, j;w, τa, τθ)− VU (i)
)α
×V˜F (i, j;w, τa, τθ)1−α;
VE(i, j) = V˜E(i, j;w
∗(i, j), τ∗a (i, j), τ
∗
θ (i, j)),
VF (i, j) = V˜F (i, j;w
∗(i, j), τ∗(i, j), τ∗θ (i, j)).
More specifically, the surplus division problem is given by
max
w,τa,τθ
(ρ+ ϕa(i, τa) + ϕθ(j, τθ) + δ˜a(i) + δ˜θ(j) + η)
−1
×
[
w + ϕa(i, τa)[QE(i+ 1, j)− VU (i)] + ϕθ(j, τθ)[VE(i, j + 1)− VU (i)]
+δ˜a(i)[Q(i− 1, j)− VU (i)] + δ˜θ(j)[Q(i, j − 1)− VU (i)]− ρVU (ai)
]α
×
[
(1− τ)y(i, j)− w + ϕa(i, τα)QF (i+ 1, j) + ϕθ(j, τθ)VF (i, j + 1)
+δ˜a(i)QF (i− 1, j) + δ˜θ(j)QF (i, j − 1)
]1−α
.
The first order conditions for this problem can be manipulated to get the reasonably
standard wage-setting equation,
w∗(i, j) = α{(1− τ∗a − τ∗θ )y(i, j) + ϕa(i, τ∗a )QF (i+ 1, j) + ϕθ(j, τ∗θ )VF (i, j + 1)
+δ˜a(i)QF (i− 1, j) + δ˜θ(j)QF (i, j − 1)}
+(1− α){ρVU (i)− ϕa(i, τ∗a )(VE(i+ 1, j)− VU (i))
−ϕθ(j, τ∗θ )(VE(i, j + 1)− VU (i))]− δ˜a(i)Q(i− 1, j)− δ˜θ(j)Q(i, j − 1)}.
The first order conditions for the investment times τa and τθ are also easily derived, but
9Note that the discount rate ρ is the same for both workers and firms, even if we do not think of firms as
being subject to a death shock. In this framework, there is essentially one worker per firm, and the worker’s
“death” terminates the match just as does a shock dissolving that particular job, η, assumed to arise due to
changes in demand conditions or other exogenous events. In both cases, the firm is left without an employee,
and we use the FEC associated with vacancies to apply the value of 0 in either case.
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are slightly more complex than is the first order condition associated with wage setting.
The assumptions regarding the investment technologies ϕa and ϕθ will obviously have
important implications for the investment rules. The time flow constraint is
1 ≥ τa + τθ,
τa ≥ 0
τθ ≥ 0.
Depending on the parameterization of the production technology, it is possible that
optimal flow investment of either type is 0, that one type of investment is 0 while
the other is strictly positive, and even that all time is spent in investment activity,
whether it be in one kind of training or both. In such a case, it is possible to produce
the implication of negative flow wages, and we will not explicitly assume these away
by imposing a minimum wage requirement in estimation. In the case of internships,
for example, which are supposed to be mainly investment activities, wage payments
are low or zero. What is true is that no worker-firm pair will be willing to engage in
such activity without the future expected payoffs being positive, which means that the
worker would be expected to generate positive flow profits to the firm at some point
during the job match.
2.2 On-the-Job Search
In the case of on-the-job search, individuals who are employed are assumed to receive
offers from alternative employers at a rate λE , and it is usually the case that λE < λU .
If the employee meets a new employer, the match value at the alternative employer,
θj′ , is immediately revealed to the searcher. Whether or not the employee leaves for
the new job and what the new wage of the employee is after the encounter depends on
assumptions made regarding whether, and if so, how, the two employers compete for the
individual’s labor services. In Flinn and Mabli (2009) and Flinn and Mullins (2015),
two cases were considered. In the first, in which employers are not able to commit
to wage offers, or unable to verify the employee’s claims regarding the existence of
such outside options, the outside option in the wage determination problem remains
the value of unemployed search, since this is the action available to the employee
at any moment in time and is the minimum welfare level of the individual. This
model produces an implication of efficient mobility, in that individuals will only leave
a current employer if the match productivity at the new employer is at least as great
as current match productivity (general productivity has the same value at all potential
employers). An alternative assumption, utilized in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002),
Dey and Flinn (2005), and Cahuc et al. (2006), for example, is to allow competing
employers to engage in Bertrand competition for the employee’s services. In this case,
efficient mobility will also result, but the wage distribution will differ in the two cases,
with employees able to capture more of the surplus (at the same values of the primitive
parameters) in the case of Bertrand competition.
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We begin by discussing the reasoning behind our decision to assume no renegotiation
of employment contracts due to the arrival of alternative employment opportunities to
the worker. We do assume that contracts are renegotiated when the productivity of
the individual on the job changes, whether due to an increase or decrease in a or θ.
After providing some motivation for the renegotiation protocal we assume, we turn to
describing the model with OTJ search.
2.2.1 The Negotiating Environment
We assume that the firm has no credible information concerning the worker’s outside
options, other than knowledge of her type, ai. In particular, the employer is not able
to verify claims that the individual has received an offer from another firm. Given
that both sides are risk neutral, long term employment contracts that guarantee the
worker fixed welfare levels across future states of the world, as in Harris and Holmstrom
(1982) and Lentz and Roys (2015), are not necessary, although they would be of value
in the case when the firm is risk neutral and the worker is risk averse, which is the case
considered in those two papers. The environment analyzed by Harris and Holmstrom
is one in which the productivity of the worker is only learned gradually over time,
and the wage contracts offered by the firm provide insurance against low productivity
outcomes. In our model, in which there is no learning and information regarding the
productivity of the worker at any moment in time is symmetric, productivity decreases
are possible over the course of a job spell, so that in the case of risk-averse workers,
downwardly-rigid wage contracts would dominate the contracts we consider. In the
case of Lentz and Roys, the contracts they analyze allow risk-averse agents to smooth
consumption, but under their assumptions, the productivity of the individual at a job
or over time is non-decreasing. Allowing for decreases in productivity would further
increase the value of the types of contracts considered by Lentz and Roys.
Even under the assumption of risk neutrality, the kind of short-term surplus re-
division that we consider faces diffiulties in the case of Bertand competition between
firms. This is due to the fact that a surplus division rule that utilizes the last rejected
employment opportunity as an outside option may be greater than the current produc-
tivity value when one or more setbacks in terms of a or θ has occurred since the last
time the contract was renegotiated. Such a nonzero-probability event would require
additional assumptions to deal with surplus division in such cases.
In the end, since the goal of this exercise is to estimate a model of on-the-job in-
vestment and wages using individual-level data, our assumptions regarding the surplus
division problem were made so as to be relatively consistent with the sample paths of
wages within and across job spells that are observed in the data. Although the within-
spell wage data from the NLSY97 are not all that one might wish for, both in terms of
quality and the frequency of observation, there is substantial indication in these data,
as well in the Survey of Income and Program Participation panels, that wage changes
within job spells are not infrequent, and include decreases as well as increases. Our
surplus division rule that is utilized everytime the value of a or θ changes within a
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spell is capable of generating these patterns. Models of Bertrand competition with no
investment on the job are not capable of generating wage decreases within a job spell,
generally speaking. A final consideration in our decision to exclude interfirm compe-
tition in wage-setting regards identification of the primitive parameters of the model,
and is primarily a pragmatic one. We face many challenges in identifying movements
in the underlying levels of the unobservable a and θ given the paucity of high-quality
data on individual wage rates within and between job spells. Wage increases within
job spells generally will indicate an increase in the value of a or θ at a particular point
in time. Were we also to allow wage increases due to the arrival of outside offers, this
would further complicate the estimation of the hazard rates (human capital production
technologies) associated with increases in a and θ.
2.2.2 Bargaining Problem with On-the-Job Search
Under our bargaining protocol, the employment contract is only a function of the
individual’s type and the current match value, (i, j). The property of efficient turnover
decisions holds, with the employee accepting all jobs with a match value j′ > j, and
refusing all others. The formal structure of the problem as follows.
V˜E(i, j;w, τa, τθ) =
NE(w, τa, τθ; i, j)
D(τa, τθ; i, j)
,
where
NE(w, τa, τθ; i, j) = w + λE
∑
s=j+1
psVE(i, s)
+ϕa(i, τa)Q(i+ 1, j) + ϕθ(j, τθ)VE(i, j + 1)
+δ˜a(i)Q(i− 1, j) + δ˜θ(j)Q(i, j − 1) + ηVU (i);
D(τa, τθ; i, j) = ρ+ λEG˜(θj) + ϕa(i, τa) + ϕθ(j, τθ)
+δ˜a(i) + δ˜θ(j) + η.
The RHS of the first line of NE contains the flow wage rate and the rate of meeting
other firms multiplied by the weighted sum of the value of meeting a firm with a higher
match productivity value. The second line is the sum of the rate of improvements in a,
as a function of the current state of a, i, and the flow rate of time invested in a, τa. The
term Q(i+1, j) = max{VE(i+1, j), VU (i+1)}, and reflects the fact that at a higher level
of a, ai+1, the match value θj may no longer be in the acceptance set of employment
contracts, in which case the worker becomes an unemployed searcher. The second term
on the line is the rate of improvement in θ given the current state of θ and investment
time (j, τθ). An improvement in match-specific capital can never lead to a voluntary
separation, of course. The final line on the RHS of NE is the flow rate of decreases in
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a and θ. Either of these events can lead to a voluntary separation, so that Q(i−1, j) =
max{V (i − 1, j), VU (i − 1)} and Q(i, j − 1) = max{VE(i, j − 1), VU (i)}. Finally, the
match can be exogenously terminated at rate η, in which case the individual enters the
unemployment state with ability level ai. One feature of our model is that transitions
from employment to unemployment can be exogenous, at rate η, or endogenous, when
a change in the value of a or a decrease in the value of θ leads to a separation. Our
estimates indicate that approximately 15 percent of transitions from employment to
unemployment are associated with changes in a or θ. The denominator D is simply the
effective discount rate, which is ρ plus the sum of all of the rates associated with the
various events described in the numerator, NE .
The value to the firm conditional on the wage and investment decisions is given by
V˜F (i, j;w, τa, τθ) =
NF (w, τa, τθ; i, j)
D(τa, τθ; i, j)
,
where
NF (w, τa, τθ; i, j) = y(i, j)(1− τa − τθ)− w + ϕa(i, τa)QF (i+ 1, j)
+ϕθ(j, τθ)VF (i, j + 1) + δ˜a(i)QF (i− 1, j)
+δ˜θ(j)QF (i, j − 1),
and where QF (i+ 1, j) = VF (i+ 1, j) if V (i+ 1, j) > VU (i+ 1) and equals 0 otherwise,
QF (i − 1, j) = VF (i − 1, j) if V (i − 1, j) > VU (i − 1) and equals 0 otherwise, and
QF (i, j − 1) = VF (i, j − 1) if j − 1 > r∗(i). Now the surplus division problem becomes:
max
w,τa,τθ
D(τa, τθ; i, j)
−1[NE(w, τa, τθ; i, j)− VU (i)]α
×NF (w, τa, τθ; i, j)1−α.
The value of unemployed search in this case is simply
VU (i) =
bai + λU
∑
j=r∗(i)+1 pjVE(i, j)
ρ+λU G˜(θr∗(i))
.
2.3 Equilibrium Model
The model described to this point is one set in partial equilibrium, with contact rates
between unemployed and employed searchers and firms viewed as exogenous. The
model can be closed most simply by employing the matching function framework of
Mortensen and Pissaridies (1994). We let the measure of searchers be given by S =
U + ξE, where U is the steady state measure of unemployed and E is the measure
of the employed (E = 1 − U, since we assume that all individuals are participants in
the labor market). The parameter ξ reflects the relative efficiency of search in the
employed state, and it is expected that 0 < ξ < 1. We denote the measure of vacancies
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posted by firms by v. The flow contact rate between workers and firms is given by
M = Sφv1−φ,
with φ ∈ (0, 1).10 Letting k ≡ v/S be a measure of labor market tightness, we can
write the rate at which searchers contact firms holding vacancies by
λF =
M
v
= kφ.
The proportion of searchers who are employed is given by ξE/S, so that the mass
of matches that involve an employed worker is simply ξE/S ×M, which means that
the flow rate of contacts for the employed is
λE =
ξE
S
Sφv1−φ
E
= ξkφ−1.
By a similar argument, the mass of matches involving an unemployed worker is U/S×
M, and the contact rate for unemployed searchers is
λU = k
φ−1.
A fact that will be utilized in the estimation of demand side parameters below is that
ξ = λE/λU .
Turning to the firm’s problem, let the flow cost of holding a vacancy be given by
ψ > 0. The distribution of potential hires is determined by the steady state distributions
of a among the unemployed and (a, θ) among the employed, which are complex objects
that have no closed form solution, due to the (endogenous) dynamics of the a and θ
processes in the population. However, these distributions are well-defined objects, the
values of which can be obtained through simulation. The way in which we obtain the
steady state distributions through simulation is described in Appendix B.
Let the steady state distribution of a among the unemployed be given by {piUi }, i =
1, ...,M, and the steady state distribution of (a, θ) among the employed by {piEi,j},
i = 1, ...,M, j = 1, ...,K. Then the expected flow value of a vacancy in the steady state
is given by
10We have fixed TFP = 1 in the Cobb Douglas matching function due to the impossibility of identifying
this parameter given the data available. The number of matches is unobserved, so that this essentially
amounts to a normalization.
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−ψ + λF
S
× {U
∑
i
∑
j≥r∗(i)+1
pjVF (i, j)pi
U
i
+ξE
∑
i
∑
j′>j
∑
j
pj′VF (i, j
′)piEi,j}.
By imposing a free entry condition on firms that equates this value to zero, the equation
can be solved for equilibrium values of λU and λE given knowledge of the parameters
ψ, φ, and ξ.
3 Data
We utilize data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) to con-
struct our estimation sample. The NLSY97 consists of a cross-sectional sample of 6, 748
respondents designed to be representative of people living in the United States during
the initial survey round and born between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1984, and
a supplemental sample of 2, 236 respondents designed to oversample Hispanic, Latino
and African-American individuals. At the time of first interview, respondents’ ages
range from 12 to 18, and at the time of the interview from the latest survey round,
their ages range from 26 to 32.
For our analysis, we use a subsample of 1,994 respondents from the NLSY97. We
obtain this sample through three main selection criteria: (1) the oversample of His-
panic, Latino, and African-American respondents is excluded so that the final sample
comprises only the nationally representative cross-sectional sample, (2) the military
sample is excluded, and (3) all females and high-school dropouts are excluded. A
respondent who satisfies these criteria enters our sample after having completed all
schooling.
The estimation sample is constructed this way since our model is not designed to
explain behavior while in school; staying in school or continuing education are not
endogenous choices. These sample selection criteria give us an unbalanced sample of
1, 994 individuals and 661, 452 person-week observations. The proportion of high school
graduates is 37 percent and the proportion of those with some college and those with
a college degree are 30 and 33 percent, respectively.
The NLSY97 provides detailed retrospective data on the labor market histories and
the wage profiles of each respondent. This retrospective data is included in the employ-
ment roster, which gives the start and end dates of each employment spell experienced
by the respondent since the last interview, wage profiles and other characteristics of
each employment (or unemployment) episode. We use the employment roster to con-
struct weekly data on individual labor market histories. This information provides us
with some of the key moments that identify the parameters of the search environment
faced by the agents in our model, including transitions between jobs.
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While we make extensive use of the weekly data constructed retrospectively from
the NLSY97 employment rosters for obtaining moments related to employment transi-
tion, our empirical analysis of wages uses information collected from respondents about
current wages as of each interview date. This information is likely to have fewer mea-
surement problems than wage information in the employment roster, which is collected
as part of a set of retrospective questions about all current and previously held jobs
since the previous interview.
In the context of the model, the duration of a job spell is indicative of the value of
the match between worker and firm. Therefore, looking at job spells of different lengths
provides information about how wages and training differ at different match values. Our
decision to only use wage observations from interview dates suggests defining the length
of a job spell as the number of annual wage observations rather than using length from
the employment roster. Table 1 shows the percentage of job spells by the number of
interview dates they span for each schooling level. This distribution closely mirrors the
actual duration distribution of jobs obtained from the employment rosters, suggesting
that the two approaches should yield similar conclusions. For high school graduates,
the table shows that about 61 percent of all observed job spells cover no interview
dates at all, 23 percent of spells span one interview date, 7 percent last long enough
to span two interview dates, and 9 percent span three or more. The proportion of job
spells with longer durations and therefore spanning more interview dates, increases by
education level. For example, for individuals with a college degree, 15 percent of job
spells span more than two interview dates.
Given the importance of schooling on the labor market environment faced by the
agents in our model, we distinguish between three groups of individuals in our empirical
analysis: (1) individuals who have a high-school degree, (2) individuals who have
attended college but who do not have a college degree, and (3) individuals with a
college degree or more. In what follows, we refer to these three levels as low, medium,
and high education groups, respectively.
In addition to key labor market variables, NLSY97 contains a wealth of information
about training, which in our model is the way workers and firms invest to build human
capital. For this aspect of our analysis, we use NLSY97’s training roster, where re-
spondents are asked about what types of training they receive over the survey year and
about the start and end dates of training periods by source of training.11 Combining
the information from the employment and training rosters, we construct a weekly event
history of employment and training for each respondent. We do not make assumptions
regarding the specificity of human capital acquired during a training episode. Instead,
we use the empirical relationship between the patterns of training and previous/future
employment and wage transitions in order to make inferences about the degree of
specificity in the human capital accumulation process.
11Examples of sources of training are business colleges, nursing programs, apprenticeships, vocational and
technical institutes, barber and beauty schools, correspondence courses and company training. Training
received in formal regular schooling programs is included in the schooling variables.
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Tables 2-3 present some descriptive statistics on the training patterns observed in
our sample. Specifically, these tables display the incidence of training by schooling and
the timing of training spells by job tenure. The proportion of respondents with at least
one training spell is 18, 13, and 13 percent for workers with low, medium, and high
education, respectively. This suggests a negative relationship between schooling and
training.
We next discuss training in relation to employment and wage transitions in our
sample. Table 4 provides detailed information about employment and wage transi-
tions between interview dates. We distinguish between three types of employment-
to-employment transitions that may occur between interview dates t − 1 and t: (1)
transitions that do not involve a change in employer, (2) transitions that involve a
change in employer, with no intervening spell of non-employment between the two
jobs, and (3) transitions that involve a change in employer, with an intervening spell
of non-employment.12 The transitions that involve a change in employer are usually
referred to as job-to-job transitions in the literature and we follow the same definitions
in our discussion. Among workers who are employed in two successive interviews, the
fraction of workers who change jobs decreases with education. For example, among
high school graduates who remain employed at consecutive interview dates t−1 and t,
19 percent had a different employer, compared to only 12 percent of college graduates.
Among workers who do change jobs, those with more education are more likely to do
so without an intervening spell of non-employment.
As discussed previously, wage growth within and across job spells is an important
indicator of which type of human capital investment behavior workers engage in. Panel
B of Table 4 shows the difference between log wages for employment-to-employment
transitions between interview dates. Again, we distinguish between the three types of
transitions described above. We observe that log wage difference (logwt− logwt−1) for
job-to-job transitions increases by education level: the average log wage difference is
0.11, 0.15 and 0.20 for low, medium and high education groups, respectively. The differ-
ences by education are particularly large for job-to-job transitions with an intervening
non-employment spell.
Finally, Table 5 shows average log wage difference between consecutive interview
dates t − 1 and t, broken down by whether the worker receives training at the job
he held at t − 1. An individual is considered to have received training if the training
roster reports him as enrolled in a training program during a week that was (1) before
interview date t − 1 and (2) while he was also employed at the job he held at time
t−1. We see that for employment transitions that do not involve a change in employer,
the average log wage difference does not change by whether the worker obtained any
training in the past. On the other hand, for employment transitions that do entail an
12Using the employment rosters, we determine that there was an intervening non-employment spell between
two consecutive jobs, if individuals are observed to be not working for a period of at least 4 weeks between
the first employment episode that covers their interview date t − 1 and second employment episode that
covers their interview date t.
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employer change (i.e. job-to-job transitions), the average log wage difference between
t and t − 1 for those individuals who obtained some form of training in the first job
spell is smaller. It is also instructive to examine the wage differences for job-to-job
transitions that involve an intervening non-employment spell. These are displayed in
the last two rows of Table 5. We see that for individuals who moved to their next job
with no intervening spell of non-employment, the average log wage difference is 0.09 if
they received training in the previous job and 0.15 if they did not.
These moments will serve as a basis for our estimation of the parameters in the
model described above.
4 Econometric Issues
4.1 Empirical Implementation of the Model
We make several assumptions in order to solve the model, which (clearly) does not
produce closed-form solutions. We restrict workers and firms to choose training times
from a discrete choice set consisting of multiples of two percent of the worker’s total
time in the range of times actually chosen and a coarser grid at higher off-equilibrium
values.13 The production functions are assumed to have the following functional forms.
Recall that there are M values of a, 0 < a1 < ... < aM . There is no possibility of
increasing ability if an individual is already at the highest level, so the hazard rate for
improvements from the state aM is equal to 0. For i < M, we specify the hazard rate
to level i+ 1 as
ϕa(i, τa) = δ
0
a × aδ
1
a
i × (τa)δ
2
a ,
where δ0a, δ
1
a, and δ
2
a are scalar constants. Similarly, there are K values of θ, 0 < θ1 <
... < θK , and no possibility to increase match productivity when θ = θK . For a worker
with j < K who spends a fraction τθ of her time in firm-specific training, the value of
the match increases at rate
ϕθ(j, τθ) = δ
0
θ × θδ
1
θ
j × (τθ)δ
2
θ ,
where, once again, δ0θ , δ
1
θ , and δ
2
θ are scalar constants.
Because it is difficult to separately identify the level of general ability and match
quality, we attempted to make the support of the distributions of a and θ as symmetric
as possible. Therefore, we choose identical grids for for ai and θj . We chose grid points
to cover the range of likely values of θ including the possibility that workers with high
values of θ will receive match-specific training that will produce match values above
the set of values that they would naturally receive from searching. In the end, we
use a grid containing 24 points which are spaced logarithmically from 2.5 standard
deviations below the mean of the theta distribution to 3.5 standard deviations above
13Specifically, τa, τθ ∈ {.00, .005, .02, .04, .06, ..., .32, .35, .4, .45, .5, .6, .7, .8, 1.00}
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it. At the estimated parameters of our baseline model, moving up by one grid point in
either a or θ corresponds to a roughly 7 percent increase in productivity.
Several model parameters are fixed outside of the estimation. We choose α = 0.5,
giving the worker and firm equal bargaining weight, and we also explore the sensitivity
of our results to variation in this parameter value. All rate parameters are expressed
at a weekly frequency and we set the time discount rate ρ0 = 0.0016, corresponding to
to a four percent annual discount rate. Finally, we set the death shock to produce an
average career length of 45 years, ` = 1/(45 · 52) = 0.00043. This produces a “total”
discount rate of ρ = 0.00203.
Training observed in the data is likely a very rough proxy for the amount of time
spent developing workers’ human capital. To relate our observed measures of training
in the data to the training time chosen in the model simulations, we assume that
a worker who spends a fraction of time τ engaged in training is observed to receive
training is that period with probability
Prob(Training observed | τ) = Φ(β0 + β1τ)
where Φ is the c.d.f. for the normal distribution. In calculating τ from the simulations,
we compute the average fraction of time spent training over each six month period,
or, for job spells lasting less than six months, over the entire job spell. In theory, we
would estimate the parameters β0 and β1. However, in practice, we find that β1 is
poorly identified and fix its value at β1 = 1.
14 We estimate β0 jointly with the other
parameters of the model, giving us a total of 19 parameters to estimate.
4.2 Estimator
4.2.1 Estimation of Supply-Side Parameters
We utilize a method of simulated moments estimator (MSM) in order to estimate all of
the parameters of the model with the exception of those characterizing firms’ vacancy
decisions. Under the data generating process (DGP) of the model, there are a number
of sharp restrictions on the wage and mobility process that are generally not consis-
tent with the empirical distributions observed. In such a case, measurement error in
wage observations is often added to the model, with the variance of this measurement
error estimated together with the other model parameters. This is not really a feasible
alternative here given that we are already trying to estimate what is essentially a con-
volution, to be explained more precisely in our discussion of identification that follows.
This implies that the addition of another random variable to the wage and mobility
processes can only exacerbate the difficulty of separately identifying the distributions
14Robustness checks with different values of β1 confirm that the parameter is not precisely estimated and
that the effect of its value on the other parameter estimates is small.
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of a and θ, particularly given their endogeneity with respect to investment decisions.15
We chose to use a moment-based estimator which employs a large amount of informa-
tion characterizing wage distributions within and across jobs, often by schooling class,
as well as some training information, as was described in the previous section.
The information from the sample that is used to define the estimator is given byMN ,
where there are N sample observations. Under the DGP of the model, the analogous
characteristics are given by M˜(ω), where ω is the vector of all identified parameters.
Then the estimator is given by
ωˆN,WN = arg min
ω∈Ω
(MN − M˜(ω))′WN (MN − M˜(ω)),
where WN is a symmetric, positive-definite weighting matrix and Ω is the parameter
space. The weighting matrix, WN , is a diagonal matrix with elements proportional to
the inverse of the variance of the corresponding element of MN . Under our random
sampling assumption, plimN→∞MN = M, the population value of the sample charac-
teristics used in estimation. Since WN is a positive-definite matrix by construction,
our moment-based estimator is consistent since plimN→∞ωˆN,Q = ω for any positive-
definite matrix Q. We compute the standard errors using an approximation to the
asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates and correcting for simulation error
based on the number of draws in the simulation.16 Our estimate for the asymptotic
variance-covariance matrix of the MSM estimator is given by,
Vˆ = (Dˆ′Wˆ Dˆ)DˆWˆ SˆWˆ Dˆ(Dˆ′Wˆ Dˆ)−1
where D = ∂m∂ω′ , S =
[
1 + 1R
]
E(m′m), m =
(
MN − M˜(ω)
)
and R is the number of
simulation draws we use.
4.2.2 Demand-Side Parameter Estimation
Recall that the matching function was defined as
M = νφS1−φ,
with ν ∈ (0, 1), and the measure of searchers was given by S = U + ξE, where U is
the measure of unemployed and E is its complement. The parameter ξ is the search
15We do introduce measurement error into the wage observations, but the variance of this error is fixed
rather than being estimated with the other model parameters. Including some realistic measurement error
allows us to consider higher moments of the wage distribution, while imposing a fixed variance prevents the
estimator from having to separately identify yet another source of variation in observed wages. Following
Bound et. al) (1994), we set the standard deviation of the measurement error on observed log wages at
σe = 0.15
16When we compute bootstrapped standard errors using different draws of the random shocks in our
simulations, we find that this approach yields comparable estimates for the effect of simulation error on the
precision of our estimates.
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efficiency of employed agents relative to that of the unemployed, and it is expected
that ξ ∈ (0, 1). The rate at which employers with vacancies contact applicants is
λF =
M
ν
= νφ−1S1−φ
= kφ−1,
where k ≡ ν/S is our measure of labor market tightness.
The proportion of matches that involve an unemployed worker is given by
U
U + ξE
M,
so that the contact rate per unemployed searcher is
λU =
U
S
M
U
= kφ.
The contact rate for employed searchers is
λE =
ξE
S
M
E
= ξkφ.
It follows that ξ = λE/λU . Since we can consistently estimate the parameters λE
and λU , it follows that a consistent estimator of ξ is given by ξˆ = λˆE/λˆU . Then a
consistent estimator for the measure of search effort on the supply side of the market
is Sˆ = Uˆ + ξˆEˆ.
Without a consistent estimate of the vacancy cost parameter, ψ, the parameters of
the matching function are not identified. We follow the usual approach for recovering an
estimate of ψ. Under the assumption of a given value of the Cobb-Douglas parameter,
φ, and that the TFP parameter in the matching function is equal to unity, we first find
an estimator for unobserved vacancies, ν. We have
λU = k
φ
= (ν/S)φ
⇒ ν = S(λU )
1
φ .
Using consistent estimates of the relevant parameters, a consistent estimate of ν is
given by
νˆ = Sˆ(λˆU )
1
φ .
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Of course, consistency of νˆ is based on the assumption that we have used the true
matching function parameter, φ. In practice, we utilize the value of 0.5, which is com-
mon in the literature (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)).
Using this estimator of ν, we then find a consistent estimator of λF , which is simply
λˆF = (vˆ/Sˆ)
φ−1.
We can then find a consistent estimator of ψ, which is given by
ψˆ = λˆF pˆ(A) ̂E(VF |A).
The estimate of ψ is used in our counterfactual experiments involving the minimum
wage. It should be borne in mind that this estimator is based on the assumption that
the Cobb-Douglas matching function parameter is equal to a given value, which in our
application is assumed to be 0.5.17
4.3 Identification of Primitive Parameters
The model is relatively complex, and many of the variables that play a major role in it
are difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Since the estimator we employ is not based
on a likelihood function, it is not possible to give a rigorous proof of identification
or lack thereof, as in the simple partial-partial equilbrium model analyzed by Flinn
and Heckman (1982). Instead, we will try to indicate the identification issues that we
face, and what features of the data may be particularly useful in estimating certain
subsets of the vector of primitive parameters. We also conduct an empirical exercise,
the results of which are described in Section 5.3, that gives us some further guidance
regarding which features of the data are most useful in separately identifying the a and
θ processes, which is the main identification problem we face.
For the moment, imagine that we have access to productivity data associated with
a worker-firm match at every moment in time. At a given point in time, potential
output is given by
y(i, j) = aiθj ,
so that
ln y(i, j) = ln ai + ln θj .
The actual productivity, after accounting for training time, is
y˜(i, j) = aiθj(1− τa − τj)
⇒ ln y˜(i, j) = ln ai + ln θj + ln(1− τa − τθ),
17In Flinn and Mullins (2015), a similar assumption was made. They also conducted some counterfactual
policy experiments involving the minimum wage and found that varying φ did not greatly change the policy
implications from the experiments.
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where the τa and τθ training times are functions of the state (i, j), as is the wage.
We see that the log of potential output is a convolution of the random variables ln a
and ln θ. In Flinn and Mullins (2015), with no investment in a or θ considered after
entry into the labor market, the distribution of ln a was fixed and ln θ was a time-
invariant characteristic of the match. There, as in this paper, turnover decisions are
not a function of a, so that an individual moving from a match value θ to a new match
value θ′ had a change in log productivity of
ln y(a, θ′)− ln y(a, θ) = ln θ′ − ln θ.
In their version of the model in which the outside option of the worker was always the
value of unemployed search, the bargained wage was w(a, θ) = α(aθ) + (1 − α)r(a),
where r(a) is the reservation value of a type a individual, so that the log of the difference
in wages across the two jobs is
ln{w(a, θ′)− w(a, θ)} = lnα+ ln a+ ln(θ′ − θ), (2)
and the variance of this quantity will only be a function of the distribution of θ. Using
moments based on these types of statistics greatly facilitates the separate identifica-
tion of the parameters characterizing the population distributions of a and θ. Flinn
and Mullins had success in producing reasonable estimates of these parametric dis-
tributions, as well as the standard transition rate parameters studied in Flinn and
Heckman (1982).
The estimation problem we face in this paper is considerably more complex than
that of Flinn and Mullins (2015). One problem is the fact that there are three endoge-
nous variables chosen by the worker-firm pair, the wage, training time in general human
capital, and training time in match-specific human capital. We do not observe the two
levels of human capital at any point in time (a, θ), which is a problem shared with
Flinn and Mullins. However, by utilizing some training data, albeit of questionable
quality, we can get some additional information on the values of (a, θ) not available
in most search models that do not allow for training. That is, our model produces
a mapping from the state variables (a, θ) → (τa, τθ). While this mapping is not, in
general, invertible, it still conveys information on the set of values (a, θ) consist with
the reported training time of the individual.
Given these issues, it is clear that the identification of the primitive parameters is
challenging. In order to convince ourselves, and the reader, that all of the moving pieces
in the model were necessary in order to fit the set of sample characteristics we utilize,
we preformed the following exercise. Since without training, the model is quite similar
to that used in Flinn and Mullins (although the papers used different data sources), it
seemed clear that we could estimate the model successfully if we shut down the growth
and depreciation processes in both a and θ. We then sought to determine whether
we could adequately fit sample characteristics by allowing growth and depreciation in
only one of a or θ. We first estimated a model in which the individual’s draw of a was
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fixed from the time of labor market entry, while we continued to allow growth and
depreciation of match-specific capital, θ. We then estimated a version of the model
that allowed for growth and depreciation in a over during employment spells while
forcing the match-specific productivity value θ to remain constant over the course of
a job spell. We briefly describe the results we obtained below, but it did emerge that
growth and depreciation in both a and θ was necessary to more satisfactorily fit the
sample characteristics that we targetted. This gave us some faith in the estimability of
the model, although more and better information on training episodes would greatly
enhance faith in the estimates we report below.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Parameter Estimates
The estimated parameter values are shown in Table 6 together with the estimated
standard errors. We start with a discussion of the parameters that control employment
transition rates. First, the flow value of unemployment for a worker of ability a is
estimated to be bˆa = 6.47a. The output of a worker of ability a at a firm with the
median match quality is estimated to be slightly lower at exp(µˆθ) · a = 4.09a. For
unemployed workers, an offer arrives at a rate of λˆu = 0.138 or approximately once
every seven weeks. Workers with medium levels of general ability accept 31 percent of
job offers, implying that the average unemployment spell lasts 23 weeks. Conversely,
matches are exogenously dissolved at a rate of ηˆ = .004, or approximately once every
five years. Matches may also be dissolved endogenously if a shock to general ability or
match quality makes unemployment preferable to the worker’s current match. To assess
the relative importance of these two shocks, we observe that the overall unemployment
rate in the model is 13.23 percent, close to the data target of 14.10 percent. The steady
state unemployment rate is higher at 19.54 percent. Together with the job finding rate
and exogenous job separation rate, this equilibrium unemployment rate implies that
approximately 15 percent of separations are endogenous. For employed workers, new
offers arrive at rate λˆe = 0.069, or approximately once every 15 weeks, about half as
frequently as for unemployed workers.
The parameters µa(e) and σa control the distribution of starting values for general
ability, where e denotes the education level of the worker. The estimated values imply
that workers with some college education begin their labor force careers with 30 percent
more human capital than high school graduates, on average, and those with at least a
bachelor’s degree begin with an additional 26 percent. These parameters are identified
largely from wages of new workers entering the labor force. We match the starting
wages of workers for the two higher education groups almost exactly. For workers
with only a high school degree, starting wages are slightly higher in the model than
in the data but subsequently increase at a slower rate. The variance for the initial
distribution of ability σˆ2a = 0.042, approximately half the variance of the distribution
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of match qualities.
The parameters that govern the technologies for the rate of increase in general
ability are δ0a, δ
1
a and δ
2
a. As specified in Section 4.1, for an individual with general
ability ai, the hazard rate of improvement to ability level ai+1 is given by
ϕa(i, τa) = δ
0
a × aδ
1
a
i × (τa)δ
2
a i < M
with the analogous expression specified for the θ process. In the estimated model, δˆ0a
and δˆ0θ are very similar: δˆ
0
a = 0.029, and δˆ
0
θ = 0.023. However, the remaining compo-
nents of the general and match-specific skill processes look considerably different. In
Table 6, we see that δˆ1a is −0.135, whereas δˆ1θ is 0.443. In other words, the parameter
estimates show that general training becomes less productive as a increases, whereas
match-specific training becomes more productive with increases in θ. This is a rea-
sonable finding since a is likely to be more difficult and costly to change after labor
market entry due to the fact that employers are not equipped to offer general learning
experiences as efficiently as are schools that specialize in increasing students’ cognitive
abilities. These parameter estimates also provide a bridge between this model and the
Flinn and Mullins (2015) specification, where a is assumed to be fixed over the labor
market career. In our model, we allow a to change over the labor market career, but
the estimated model shows that it can indeed be thought of as quasi-fixed since it is
difficult to change after labor market entry.
As mentioned earlier, the training observed in the data is likely a very rough proxy
for the amount of time spent developing workers’ human capital. Despite the predic-
tions of our model that most workers are generally receiving some kind of training, only
five percent of workers in the data report training in their current job. The parameters
β0 and βτ control the relationship between training in the model and the probability
that we observe a worker to be receiving training in the data. We normalize β1 to 1 and
estimate β0 to be −2.73. This means that although the median worker in our model
spends 20 percent of her time training, we expect that this worker will be observed to
be involved in training only one percent of the time. For a worker engaged in full-time
training, we would expect to observe this training in the data only 35 percent of the
time.
We fix the value of the surplus share parameter α to 0.5 in the estimation. We
believe that it is difficult to estimate this parameter given our data limitations, despite
the fact that it should in theory be identified under our functional form assumptions.
In Appendix A, we perform a sensitivity analysis by reestimating the model under
different values of α. The results show that worker’s surplus share plays a significant
role in determining the type of investment that takes place as well as in determining the
importance of initial labor market endowments. More specifically, when α increases,
general training increases, leading to a more rapidly increasing wage profile during
the course of a worker’s labor market career. These findings suggest that with better
training data, α can be estimated.
27
5.2 Model Fit
In this section, we compare the fit of the simulations from our estimated model to
the corresponding moments in the data. We begin by comparing the model-predicted
and observed wage distributions. Conditioning on tenure and education, we construct
histogram plots from the simulated and observed wages, shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3 for
workers with 0-2, 3-5 and 6-8 years of tenure, respectively. Overall, the model-predicted
wage distributions are close to the empirical ones.
Next, we evaluate the ability of the model to replicate the training patterns in the
data. In Table 7, we see that the observed and model-predicted proportion of individu-
als who have participated in at least one training spell during the time they are observed
is 15 and 17 percent, respectively. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 further reveal that
the model accurately captures the decreasing pattern of training with education, albeit
with a small tendency to overstate the incidence of training for low-education workers:
the proportion of individuals who get training at least once is 18, 13 and 13 percent
for the low, medium and high education workers, respectively; whereas in the model
simulations these moments are 21, 16 and 12 percent.
One of the distinguishing features of our model is our focus on within-job spell
investment in human capital. This investment behavior, whether general or match-
specific, impacts transition rates and wage processes within and across job spells. In
the estimation, we match moments related to the joint distribution of wages between
consecutive interview dates within a job spell as well as the joint distribution of wages
between consecutive interview dates between different job spells. Table 8 displays how
the model performs in generating some of these transition moments. Here, we limit
our discussion to events that span only two consecutive interview dates, t − 1 and t,
and to workers who are employed at both dates. As described in the data section, we
consider three possible events that may occur between t − 1 and t: 1) no job change,
2) job-to-job transition with an intervening spell of non-employment, and 3) job-to-job
transition with no intervening spell of non-employment.18
First, we consider the the proportion of job-to-job transitions with no intervening
spell of non-employment, shown in Panel A of Table 8. In the data, the proportion of
job-to-job transitions are 15, 12, and 10 percent for the low, medium and high-education
groups, respectively. The corresponding model-predictions for these moments are 17,
17, and 16 percent, respectively. Hence, the model-predicted transition rates are rea-
sonably close to the actual ones in the data for the lower education workers. However,
for the higher education groups, the model overstates the proportion of job-to-job
transitions with no intervening spell of non-employment.
Next, we examine the distribution of wage changes between consecutive interview
dates, shown in Panels B and C of Table 8. We focus our discussion on the moments
18As described in the data section, we define a job-to-job transition to not involve a intervening non-
employment spell if the time between the end of first job and beginning date of second job is a non-
employment spell of 4 weeks or less. This allows us to distinguish between instantaneous turnovers from
those that involve a period of search between consecutive jobs.
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for high-school graduates, shown in Column (1), though the patterns for the other
two education groups, shown in Columns (2) and (3), are similar. Panel B shows
the average wage growth during these employment spells. In the data, for job-to-job
transitions with an intervening non-employment spell the average log wage difference
is 0.06. For job-to-job transitions with no intervening non-employment spell, it is 0.12.
The corresponding moments in the model simulations are −0.10 and 0.18, respectively.
These numbers show that the estimated model captures correctly the direction of the
implications of an intervening non-employment spell, but that it performs poorly in
matching the levels of these changes. Similarly, Panel C shows that in the data, the
proportion of job-to-job transitions that are associated with a wage decrease is 40
percent with an intervening non-employment spell, and only 30 percent without. The
corresponding moments in the model simulations are 63 and 27 percent so that the
model overstates the fraction of negative changes for transitions that include a spell of
non-employment. Nevertheless, the model correctly captures the fact that transitions
spanning a non-employment spell are more likely to have negative wage growth than
those that do not.
To understand the intuition behind these moments, we recall that in the model,
values of θ and any investment made in match-specific productivity do not carry over
into future employment, whereas general human capital does. For a worker who directly
switches to a new job, the only acceptable jobs are those that have θ values higher than
his current value. Therefore, the average wage gains from a job-to-job transition are
high and the proportion of negative wage transitions is low (and would be zero without
any measurement error). In contrast, for transitions that do involve an intervening
non-employment spell, the worker loses the value from his accumulated match-specific
human capital. Once he enters unemployment, he is willing to accept offers with a wider
range of θ values, including values that are lower than the match quality at his recent
job. His willingness to accept such offers decreases the average wage change across
such transitions and results in a higher fraction of wage changes that are negative.
The wage losses predicted by this mechanism in the model are evidently larger than
those observed in the data.
5.3 Empirical Results on Identification Issues
In this section, we reestimate the model under two restrictions on human capital in-
vestment. The first exercise entails eliminating the possibility of investment in general
human capital and the second entails eliminating the possibility of match-specific in-
vestment. As discussed in Section 4.3, the purpose of these empirical exercises is to
illustrate which features of the data are most useful in separately identifying the a and
θ processes.
First, we compare the model predictions and parameter estimates we obtain from
the constrained estimation with no possibility of investment in general human capital
to the ones we obtain from the baseline estimation. In the absence of general human
capital accumulation, all wage growth within a job spell is attributed to growth in the
29
worker’s match-specific human capital, which must increase more quickly than in the
baseline model to match the overall rate of wage growth. Because workers have more
match-specific human capital, fewer potential offers would cause them to leave their
current employers and we would therefore expect, holding all else constant, a decrease
in the job-to-job transition rates. In the absence of fewer acceptable outside job offers
for employed workers, the estimation with no general human capital accumulation
generates job-to-job transitions by adjusting up the estimate of the job offer rate (λe)
relative to the baseline estimate. This can be seen in Table 9, where our estimate for
the job offer rate (λe) increases to 0.082 from a baseline value of 0.069. The job-to-job
transitions are displayed in Table 10, which compares the moments for the constrained
estimations and the baseline estimation. Panel A of Table 10 shows that the job-to-job
transition rates are slightly lower for the constrained estimation with no a, relative to
the baseline estimation.
A second consequence of the increase in match-specific human capital is that the
the wage gains from job-to-job transitions with no intervening non-employment spell
tend to be smaller.19 As a result, the restricted model is less able to match the wage
growth across job-to-job transitions with no intervening non-employment spell. We
see this change in Panel C of Table 10, where the proportion of job-to-job transitions
associated with a wage decrease is 26 percent in the baseline estimated model and is
44 percent in the estimated model with no a.
This reveals an important aspect of identification between general and match-
specific human capital in the model estimation: transition data alone is not sufficient
to distinguish between the different types of human capital and we need transition data
in conjunction with moments that pertain to the joint distribution of wages within and
across job spells in order to isolate one form of investment from the other.
Next, we reestimate the model with only general training. This version of the
model does a better job of matching average wage growth within and across job spells.
However, without match-specific training, the model is unable to capture the differences
in wage growth and separation rates that we observe between short and long job spells.
In all versions of the model, longer job spells are associated with higher match qualities.
In the baseline model, the productivity of match-specific training rises with the quality
of the match since δˆθ2 > 0. This explains why jobs with better matches experience
more wage growth. In addition, the increase in match quality over time due to match-
specific training explains the decrease in the job-to-job transition rate with increasing
job tenure. The alternative model with only general training is unable to match these
features of the data.
The results from the constrained estimations discussed above demonstrate the em-
pirical content of general and match-specific investments. As the results illustrate,
general and match-specific investment have distinct implications for subsequent em-
ployment and wage transitions. These distinct implications can be summarized through
plotting the life-cycle wage profiles obtained from each estimation. These graphs are
19Formally, θ is log-normally distributed so E(θ′ − θ|θ′ > θ) is decreasing in θ.
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displayed in Figure 4. Each panel in Figure 4 corresponds to a different education
level. We see the same pattern for all three education groups: the initial accepted
wages (wages that correspond to Year 0-2 of labor market tenure) are lower in the
estimated model with no investment in θ and higher in the estimated model with no
investment in a, with the baseline in between. This order gets reversed as the worker
accumulates more labor market experience. In other words, by Year 6-8, the average
log wages that correspond to the estimated model with no investment in θ overtakes
the other two so that average log wages for the case with no investment in a is the
smallest among all three estimated models. In the estimated model with only general
human capital investment, the benefits of any training undertaken by the worker can
be carried over to other jobs. The resulting wage growth throughout the labor market
career of a worker is consequently larger relative to the estimated model with only θ
investment.
The opposite is true for the estimated model with no a investment: the only training
that a worker is able to engage in is training in θ, which is something that he cannot
carry over to future jobs. Hence, the amount of benefits that he can accrue and
transfer to future periods is smaller in the estimated model with no a investment and,
consequently, overall wage growth throughout the labor market career is much lower.
This is why the average log wage for the case with no a is the lowest at the end of the
Year 6-8 tenure profile.
The comparison between these wage plots shows us that the difference between
wage growth rates during the course of a worker’s career within a firm and over the
course of a worker’s overall labor market career is an important indication of the type
of training as well.
5.4 Policy Rules
5.4.1 Acceptable Job Offers
We next explore the choices of workers and firms implied by these parameter values.
First, we consider the worker’s decision to accept a match. A worker of ability a
who receives an offer with match value θ will accept the offer if θ > θ∗(a), and will
otherwise remain unemployed and continue to search. For our estimated parameters,
we plot θ∗(a) in Figure 5. As shown in the graph, the value of θ∗(a) rises as a increases.
To understand the reason for this increase, we need to examine the choice of how much
general training the firm provides at each combination of a and θ, which is plotted in
Figure 7. At low values of a, for values of θ just above θ∗(a), workers spend a full 25
percent of their time engaged in general training. This suggests that these marginal
matches become feasible only because of the opportunity they provide for the workers
to build their general human capital. As a increases and general training becomes less
productive (because δa1 < 0), these marginal draws no longer deliver positive surplus
relative to unemployment, and workers raise their reservation value of θ. In other
words, low ability workers are more eager to accept lower quality matches because of
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the training opportunities, while higher ability workers find this training less valuable
and prefer to search for more productive matches.
Next, we consider more broadly the choices of how much general and match-specific
training firms and workers choose to provide for different levels of (a, θ). As background
for this discussion, we need to understand how much workers value each kind of training
relative to simply receiving wages. To this end, we examine Figure 6, which shows
combinations of training and wages that solve the bargaining problem between the
worker and the firm. Near the actual solution, the wages decrease quickly as the
firm chooses to provide more general training, suggesting that workers regard general
training as a good substitute for wages. In contrast, increasing match-specific training
results in a much smaller decrease in wages, implying that the worker’s value from
additional match-specific training is small, and that most of the value from match-
specific training goes to the firm. However, the worker does seem to receive some
benefit from the match-specific training, which is reflected in her willingness to trade
off some wages for more match-specific training.
5.4.2 Training Policies
Having identified the trade-offs between wages and training, we next examine the three
outcomes of the bargaining process: the two types of training and the wage. In Figures
8 to 9, we plot the amount of general and match-specific training and wages that workers
receive at different combinations of a and θ. For ease of illustration, both states are
shown on a log scale and the lines on the graph show contours along which wages or
the amount of training remains constant. The bottom of the figures, corresponding to
low values of θ, are combinations for which workers will not accept the job offer.
Looking first at the policy for firm-specific training plotted in Figure 8, we see that
the amount of firm-specific training is largely a function of the current value of θ with
much less dependence on the worker’s level of general ability. At values of θ just above
the minimum θ∗(a) threshold, the amount of training is small. Firm-specific training
increases for higher values of θ, reaching a maximum of 14 percent of the worker’s time
at roughly the 85th percentile of the distribution of acceptable θ draws. Two different
mechanisms contribute to this pattern. First, in the estimated model, δˆ1θ > 0 so firm-
specific training is more productive at higher values of θ. Second, at higher values of
θ, the expected duration of the current match increases as it becomes less likely that
the worker will leave to take an outside offer. Because firm-specific training increases
future output only for as long as the worker remains with her current employer, this
increase in expected duration raises the value of match-specific training. Offsetting
these effects is the incentive for the firm to provide match-specific training in order to
raise the value of θ and thereby increase the length of the current match. This incentive
is stronger at lower values of θ because the density of potential job offers is higher so
that increase in θ yields a greater reduction in the fraction of outside offers that would
cause the worker to leave.
Next, we look at the amount of general training provided to the workers, which we
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plot in Figure 7. In matches with low values of a and θ, workers spend about 25 percent
of their time engaged in general training. The amount of training decreases at higher
values of either a or θ. The decreasing amount of general training with increasing
ability is attributable simply to the decreasing productivity of this training for higher
ability worker (δˆ1θ < 0). Meanwhile, the decrease in general training at higher values of
θ reflects a decline in the bargaining position of workers as match quality increases. To
understand this explanation, we note that unlike the match-specific training discussed
above, a worker retains her accumulated general human capital even after the current
match is dissolved, so general training does not become more valuable as the expected
duration of the match increases. Rather, as in a standard Ben-Porath model, the
benefits of general training flow largely to the worker and the amount of general training
is determined by the worker’s trade-off in allocating time between production and the
accumulation of general human capital. In the context of our model, this implies that
negotiations over the amount of general training should look similar to the negotiations
over wages. In states where the bargaining process yields higher compensation for the
worker, he will choose to receive some of this compensation as higher wages and some
as general training. Indeed, in Figure 9, we show that, like general training, the fraction
of worker’s output that is paid in wages also decreases with match quality.
Given these policy rules, how much training do workers actually receive? Based on
the simulations from the estimated model, Figure 10 plots the fraction of time that
workers spend training as they move through the first years of their careers. When
workers first enter the labor force, initial match qualities are relatively low and therefore
most of the training takes the form of general training. In the model simulations,
workers in their first year in the labor force spend about 19 percent of their time
in general training and 7 percent in firm-specific training. Over time, match quality
increases as workers sort into jobs of higher match quality. Because the expected
duration of these jobs is higher and also because firm-specific training becomes more
productive at higher values of θ, a larger fraction of the training becomes firm-specific.
As both kinds of human capital increase further over time, workers spend less time
training and more time engaged in production. In the long-run, workers in our model
spend about 11 percent of their time training, split evenly between the general and
match-specific types.
5.5 Efficiency
We next consider what would be an efficient amount of training in our model and
ask how the quantity of training undertaken in our baseline model compares to this
ideal. For this discussion, we think of the efficient amount of training as the choice
that maximizes the present discounted value of the worker’s expected future output
(including unemployment benefits, which are here interpreted as home production).20
20To solve the full social planner problem, we would also want to choose a market tightness that takes into
account the firms’ vacancy posting costs in maximizing overall surplus. However, because of the difficulty in
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Intuitively, inefficiencies arise because the firm does not internalize the full benefits
of general training insofar as this training also increases the worker’s productivity at
future jobs. In contrast, the worker does fully internalize these benefits. Similarly, the
firm has a strong incentive to provide match-specific training, which both increases
productivity and decreases the likelihood that the worker will move to a different
firm. In contrast, the worker prefers to spend less time on match-specific training
and instead to increase his match-specific capital by searching for a better match with
a different firm, a process that is costless in our framework. Because the worker’s
preferences incorporate the true benefits of both kinds of training, solving the Nash
bargaining problem where the worker has all the bargaining weight (α = 1) should
produce training decisions that achieve this efficient outcome.
When we resolve the model with α = 1, we find, unsurprisingly, that the amount
of general training increases while the amount of match-specific training decreases. In
other words, the inefficiencies in the baseline model take the form of an under-provision
of general training and an over-provision of match-specific training, reflecting the ef-
fect of the firm’s preferences on the bargaining solution. Quantitatively, the efficient
solution includes only slightly more general training than the baseline solution. Intu-
itively, it appears that even with a lower bargaining weight, the worker can come close
to her preferred level of general training by accepting lower wage payments instead.
Meanwhile, the baseline model includes a significant amount of excess match-specific
training compared to the efficient solution, suggesting that this may be a much larger
source of inefficiency than the slight under-provision of general training.
5.6 Sources of Wage Growth
We now examine the factors that drive wage growth in the model and provide a link
between our structural approach and the well-known results from the literature on
Mincer-type earnings functions. The model contains five possible sources of wage
growth. First, workers can increase their productivity by building general human
capital through on-the job training. Second, workers can increase productivity by
searching for a new job with a higher match quality. Third, workers can improve the
quality of the match with their current employers by engaging in firm-specific training.
Fourth, as workers spend less time training and more time engaged in production, some
of this increased output will flow to them in the form of higher wages.21 Finally, the
bargaining between workers and firms can result in different shares of worker output
being paid as wages depend on the value of the workers’ outside options. The current
section aims to quantify the importance of each of these channels.
identifying these costs (see the discussion in Section 4.2.2), we leave this exercise for future research.
21Alternatively, a shift towards less training and higher wages could be interpreted as a shift in the workers’
compensation towards higher current wages and away from expected higher future wages.
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5.6.1 Growth of Wage Components
To start, we recall that output y = a · θ · (1 − τa − τθ). Additionally, it is useful to
decompose θ into two separate components, as θ = θ0 · θτ where θ0 the match quality
at the start of the match, and θτ is the additional match quality accumulated through
match-specific training (net of depreciation). This allows us to formally write the wage
w as the product of the five pieces described above:
w = a · θ0 · θτ · (1− τa − τθ) · (w/y)
or in logs,
log(w) = log(a) + log(θ0) + log(θτ ) + log(1− τa − τθ) + log(w/y)
In Figure 11, we plot the evolution of each of these five components, together with
the total wage, as workers move through the early years of their careers. The figure
shows that in the worker’s first few years in the labor force, the two most important
sources of wage growth are the development of match-specific human capital through
search and growth of general human capital through training. In later years, increases
in general ability account for a larger fraction of total wage growth as the rise in
match-specific human capital slows over time. As described above, the time spent
training decreases over a worker’s career and this reduction contributes noticeably to
the worker’s overall output and therefore to his wage. The last component, the fraction
of output represented by the worker’s wage, declines slowly over time as both a and θ
rise, producing some drag on wage growth through workers’ careers.
5.6.2 Interpreting Mincer Regressions
Our structural model also allows us to interpret the coefficients of a standard wage
regression in terms of the different source of wage growth discussed above. This anal-
ysis helps relate our results to the well-known results from the literature on earnings
dynamics. As an example, we consider a simple Mincer wage regression of the form
log(wageit) =
∑
j
βwj X
j
it + ε
w
it
where log(wageit) is the log of the wage for person i at time t. Specifically, we estimate
log(wageit) = β
w
0 +
∑
e
βwe edie + β
w
y yearsit + β
w
t tenureit + ε
w
it. (3)
where edie is a dummy variable indicating that person i has education level e (for each
level of education except HS graduate), yearsit denotes the number of years in the
labor force and tenureit the length of time with current employer. We first estimate
this model on the actual NLSY data and then on the simulated data from the model.
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Results are shown in the first two lines of Table 11. As expected, more education, more
years in the labor force and greater job tenure are all associated with higher wages.
Comparing the regressions on the real and simulated data, we find that additional
education is associated with less of an increase in wages in the simulated data than
the actual data. Also, relative to the data, slightly more of the wage growth in the
model is attributed to tenure with particular employers and less to overall labor-market
experience.
Focusing on the regression using the simulated data, we next aim to understand
how the increases in wages associated with education, labor market experience and job
tenure reflect the different determinants of wages present in the model. Similar to the
decomposition described in the previous section, we can decompose log wages in the
model as a sum of the logs of i) general ability, ii) match quality at the start of the match
iii) additional match quality accumulated through match-specific training, iv) time
spent not training and v) wage as a fraction of output. Additionally, because we are
interested in the level of wages rather than just the growth rate, we express the worker’s
general ability as a combination of her initial endowment (a0) and the additional human
capital he accumulates through training (aτ ). This defines six components of wages,
which we denote Y kit , k = 1, ..., 6, allowing us to write
log(wit) =
∑6
k=1 log(Y
k
it )
= log(a0,it) + log(aτ,it) + log(θ0,it) + log(θτ,it) + log(1− τa,it − τθ,it) + log(wityit )
(4)
In order to measure how education, labor-market experience and job tenure affect each
of these components, we repeat the regression from Equation 3 on each of these six
pieces separately, i.e. we estimate
log(Y kit ) =
∑
j
βkjX
j
it + ε
k
it, k = 1, ..., 6.
It is straightforward to show that for each covariate (indexed by j), the sum of the
regression coefficients from these six regressions must equal the coefficient for regression
using the total log wage, i.e.
βwj =
6∑
k=1
βkj .
This allows us to interpret each of the coefficients βwj from Equation 3 as reflecting
different combinations of the components of wages defined in Equation 4. The results
of this exercise, which we present in Table 11, are all quite reasonable. The increase
in wages with more education is largely picking up differences in initial ability and, to
a lesser extent, the fact that more educated workers spend less of their time training.
The positive coefficient on labor market experience is mostly capturing general ability
acquired through training and, to some extent, workers’ ability to find better matches
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over time. Finally, the increase in wages for workers with more tenure mostly reflects
improved match quality from training. Wages also appear to increase with tenure
because workers engage in less training as they remain with a firm longer, and there
is an additional selection effect whereby longer-tenured workers have received better
initial matches with their firms.
In addition to studying Mincer wage regressions on the entire sample, we can run
these regressions separately on workers with different amounts of education to help
understand differences in wage growth between these groups. Results from this exercise
are shown in Table 12. The first panel shows the difference in the constant term. The
model captures the higher wages of more educated workers and, as one would expect,
most of this difference is captured simply by the higher amounts of general human
capital that more educated workers have upon entering the labor force. In addition, a
portion of the differences is explained by the fact that more highly educated workers
spend less time training and more time engaged in production.
In the middle panel of Table 12, we show the effect of increasing labor market
experience on wages for the three different education groups. In the data, high school
graduates receive a larger increase in wages for each year in the labor market than do
more educated workers. In the model, the wages of less-educated workers do increase
more quickly because they receive more general training. However, the effect of these
differences in the simulations is small and is largely offset by the tendency of less-
educated workers to move more slowly into matches of higher quality.
The final panel of Table 12 describes the returns to increasing tenure for each of the
three education groups. In both the data and the model, workers with more education
have higher returns to tenure, though the relationship is somewhat weaker in the
model than in the data. In the model, most of this difference is accounted for by more
educated workers building more match-specific human capital from training during
their job spell. This difference emerges because more educated workers are more likely
to accept jobs where the match quality is higher, which makes match-specific training
more productive.
6 Policy Analysis: The Minimum Wage and In-
vestment
In competitive markets, minimum wages are expected to impact human capital for-
mation in relatively immediate ways (Leighton and Mincer (1981), Hashimoto (1982)).
In the case of general human capital, the returns to which accrue to the worker, the
theory implies that the sum of the cost of investment and the wage paid to the worker
should be equal to the worker’s (marginal) productivity. Restrictions on the wage that
must be paid to the worker act as a constraint on the amount of general human capital
investment that the individual can undertake, which typically results in lower levels of
investment early in the labor market career than would be efficient. Within our mod-
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eling framework, in which there exist two types of human capital and search frictions,
these types of considerations still apply, but in a much more subtle manner.
One of the more interesting implications of our model regarding the impact of
minimum wage laws is that, given the existence of search frictions and the possibility
of improving the productivity of the match, the introduction of a minimum wage that
exceeds the current flow productivity of the match need not lead to the termination
of the employment contract. Models in which the productivity of the match is fixed
produce the implication that all matches with flow productivities less than the value
of the minimum wage will be terminated (Flinn (2006), Flinn and Mullins (2015)).
The possibility of increasing the flow productivity means that the decision to keep
the match alive involves a comparison of the expected profits of the match (to the
firm) with its outside option of zero, while the worker must receive an expected value
of continuing on the job at the binding minimum wage that exceeds the value of
unemployed search under the new minimum wage. In general, not all matches with
current flow net productivity aθ < m, where m is the newly imposed minimum wage,
will be terminated. The likelihood of termination in such a case will be a function
not only of net productivity, but also the mix of general and match-specific capital
possessed by the worker. For a given shortfall in net productivity with respect to the
minimum wage, firms will be more likely to continue the match when match-specific
capital is greater. To eventually earn positive flow profits from the match, the employee
will have to be likely to remain with the firm, and this is an increasing function of the
current level of θ. Moreover, this consideration will make it more likely for the worker-
firm pair to invest in match-specific human capital than general human capital. The
extent of these effects will depend on the parameters characterizing the model.
As has been found in Flinn (2006) and Flinn and Mullins (2015), the impact of the
minimum wage is likely to vary significantly depending on whether we use the partial
or general equilibrium version of the model. In the partial equilibrium version, contact
rates (λU and λE) are assumed to be fixed. In the general equilibrium version of the
model, these contact rates are a function of the job vacancy creation decisions of firms.
As minimum wages increase, the share of the match surplus accruing to firms shrinks,
which decreases firms’ incentives to create vacancies. This corresponds, roughly, to a
shift downward in the demand function, and exacerbates the minimum wage’s negative
impact on the employment rate. We begin our analysis with the partial equilibrium
version of the model.
6.1 Minimum Wage in Partial Equilibrium
In order to study the effect of a minimum wage in the context of our model, we use
the estimates of the model parameters and then solve the model imposing a minimum
wage of $15 per hour (in 2014 dollars, corresponding to $10.17 in the 1994 dollars we
use in our analysis). As expected, we find that imposing a minimum wage increases the
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unemployment rate by rendering low quality matches unprofitable for firms.22 Figure
12 shows the minimal acceptable match quality draw in the baseline model and under
the minimum wage. In our simulations, the minimum wage has the largest effect
on employment for workers who have recently entered the labor force, raising the
unemployment rate of workers with just one year of experience from 12.2 percent to
14.0 percent. The impact fades over time so that the unemployment rate for workers
with 10 year experience is just two-tenths lower with the minimum wage than without
it (8.4 percent compared to 8.2 percent).
In addition to the effect on employment, our model shows how the minimum wage
can also affect the amount of training provided to employed workers. Because employers
must pay workers a higher wage, they decrease the amount of compensation that is
provided in the form of general training. Figure 13 compares the amount of training
that workers receive in the baseline model and under the minimum wage. With a
minimum wage in place, employed workers spend 5-10 percent less time on general
training than they do in the baseline model. For workers who have been in the labor
force for 10 years, average general ability is about 1 percent lower as a result of this
decrease in training.
Conditional on employment, workers receive higher wages with a minimum wage in
place than they do in the baseline model. Average wages are 7 percent higher for work-
ers entering the labor force, though this difference disappears within 6-7 years. Most
directly, when the minimum wage is binding, employers must pay workers a higher
fraction of their output then they otherwise would in order to raise their wages to the
required level. In addition, part of this increase is due to selection on both general
ability and match quality as the presence of a minimum wage raises the distribution of
acceptable match values and also disproportionately keeps low-ability workers unem-
ployed. Finally, the lower amount of training discussed above means that workers are
spending more of their time engaged in production and some of this additional output
naturally flows to the worker in the form of higher wages. Quantitatively, this total
increase in wages is mostly attributable to the increase in accepted match quality, the
selection of higher ability workers and the decrease in training time, with the increase
in the workers’ wages as a fraction of total output contributing a smaller amount.
Looking in more detail at the effect of the minimum wage on the distribution of
wages, Figure 14 shows how various percentiles of the wage distribution evolve with
labor market experience, with and without the minimum wage. As expected, most
of the of effect of the minimum wage occurs at the bottom of the distribution. For
workers entering the labor market, the minimum wage raises the first percentile of the
wage distribution by 50 percent and this difference persists even as workers gain more
experience. At the tenth percentile, wages start out 20 percent higher for new workers
but the effect fades after workers have been working for several years. Meanwhile, the
effect on workers further up the distribution is insignificant.
22Recall that our model does not include a labor force participation decision. An increase in unemployment
translates into a decrease in employment, since these rates sum to one.
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Overall, the welfare effects from the minimum wage are small as the loss to workers
from a higher unemployment rate and lower amounts of general training is largely
offset by the higher wages they receive. Workers at the very lowest value of general
ability experience a welfare loss of just 0.1 percent as they are most impacted by the
lower job-finding rates. For high school graduates on average, the welfare loss is just
0.02 percent and it is even smaller for those with more education. These relatively
small effects are due to the minimum wage being set at a relatively low level taking
into account the baseline marginal wage distribution. Obviously, at higher values, the
minimum wage impacts extend further up the ability distribution.
6.2 Minimum Wage in General Equilibrium
We now consider the impact of minimum wage increases in a simple general equilibrium
version of the search and matching model in which firms’ vacancy creation decisions
and the measure of unemployed and employed searchers determine the contact rates λU
and λE . In order to move to the general equilibrium framework, we need to define the
steady-state distribution of workers, which is used in computing the expected return
to a filled vacancy when solving for firms’ vacancy creation decisions. We describe the
computation of this steady-state distribution in Appendix B.
Having identified the baseline steady-state distribution of workers, the next chal-
lenge is to is to identify the firm’s cost for posting a vacancy, ψ, and the value of the
Cobb-Douglas parameter in the aggregate matching function, φ. Following the discus-
sion in Section 4.2.2, we fix the Cobb-Douglas parameter at φ = 0.5 and back out the
vacancy cost. This procedure produces an estimate of the vacancy cost ψˆ = 190.
In general equilibrium, the minimum wage constraint reduces the firm’s incentive to
post a vacancy and therefore decreases the number of vacancies and the rate at which
workers receive job offers. With a minimum wage of $15 (in 2014 dollars), the minimum
wage binds on a very small fraction of matches in the steady state distribution so that
the impact on transition rates is small: the change in job-finding rates is negligible and
the steady-state unemployment rate only rises 0.15 percentage points relative to the
baseline. The average level of general human capital in the economy falls by 0.3 percent,
with the losses concentrated among high school graduates, for whom general ability
decreases by an average of 0.6 percent. Combining the slightly higher unemployment
rate and the slightly lower stock of human capital, total output falls 0.3 percent relative
to the baseline with no minimum wage. Finally, looking at the welfare effects, the
minimum wage produces a small average welfare loss for high school graduates, equal
to just 0.05 percent on average, with an even smaller effect for workers with more
education.
The general equilibrium effects become more significant at higher values of the
minimum wages. As an illustration, we consider a minimum wage equal to $20.23 With
the minimum wage set at $20, the job offer rate falls by one percent and the steady-
23Twenty dollars, measured in 2014 dollars, becomes $13.56 when expressed in our units of 1994 dollars.
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state unemployment rate increases an additional 1.2 percentage points. In addition,
because low-ability workers are employed less and receive less training, the amount
of general human capital in the economy falls 4.1 percent for high school graduates
and an average of 1.8 percent across all workers. At this higher minimum wage, total
output is 2 percent lower than in the baseline economy and welfare losses increase to
0.8 percent for high school graduates and 0.2 percent for those with some college.
7 Conclusion
We have developed an estimable model of investment in both (completely) general and
(completely) match-specific human capital while individuals are active members of
the labor force, which we assume follows the completion of formal full-time schooling.
While other researchers have examined investment decisions in a search, matching,
and borrowing framework, ours is perhaps the first to attempt to estimate such a
model in a reasonably general framework. Perhaps the greatest challenge we face in
estimation is to attain credible identification of such a model when human capital stocks
and investments essentially are unobservable. In this we are aided by having access
to (self-reported) data on whether a worker engaged in formal training during a job
spell. We heavily exploit this information in our moment-based estimation procedure.
Furthermore, our assumptions regarding the specificity of human capital imply that
changes in the stock of general human capital have no impact on the future mobility
decisions of an individual during the employment spell. This stands in stark contrast
to changes in the stock of match-specific human capital, which strictly reduce the
likelihood of accepting a job with another firm during the employment spell. Thus job-
to-job mobility along with wage changes during the current job spell can be utilized to
infer whether the wage change was the result of general or match-specific investment.
Our estimates of the human capital production technology exhibit decreasing re-
turns to investment in both types of human capital, of approximately the same degree.
Our production technology also includes a TFP term that captures how the current
level of both types of human capital affect the returns to investment. Here we find that
the payoffs from time investment in match-specific human capital are increasing in its
current level, while there is no impact of the current level of general human capital on
the return to investment in it. These results imply fairly complex dynamic patterns in
investment and wage growth. They also serve to produce a job acceptance probability
from the unemployment state that is non-monotone in the individual’s level of general
human capital.
We use our estimates to examine the impact of minimum wage policy on investment
in human capital and equilibrium outcomes. Our experiments are conducted in both
partial and general equilibrium frameworks, where the general equilibrium specification
relies on the typical matching function approach. Unlike previous estimates of these
minimum wage effects, as in Flinn (2006) and Flinn and Mullins (2015), the deleterious
effects on high minimum wages on job finding rates can partially be alleviated by
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increases in the productivity of workers, which is obtained by investment in general
and match-specific human capital on the job. In the general equilibrium setting, we
find that a minimum wage of $15 does little to affect the labor market equilibrium,
since the steady state distributions of worker and match quality used to determine
the vacancy creation decisions of firms already produce a vast majority of matches
that have productive quality levels greater than this amount. A minimum wage of $20
dollars an hour also has fairly minor impacts on unemployment and other features of
the labor market equilibrium. On the other hand, the impact of a minimum wage of
$25 dollars an hour does have notable impacts on unemployment and the steady state
distribution of human capital and wages. To some extent, these results parallel those
found in Flinn and Mullins (2015), which examined minimum wage impacts within a
model of formal schooling decisions that did not allow post-schooling investment in
human capital of either type.
In our future research, we intend to endogenize the formal schooling decision, as
in Flinn and Mullins. This will provide us with a relatively complete model of human
capital investment over the entire life-cycle, and will allow us to examine the relation-
ship between the human capital acquired during the formal schooling phase and that
acquired while in the labor market. Our belief is that formal school training is to
some extent similar to what we are calling general human capital in this paper, but
that the two are not perfect substitutes in production. We believe that much of what
one acquires during formal schooling is a technology for learning, which impacts the
production of both general and match-specific human capital during the individual’s
labor market career. In this view, skills acquired or not acquired during early peri-
ods of development and formal schooling will have long-lasting effects on labor market
outcomes and lifetime welfare.
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Appendix
A Sensitivity Analysis with Different Bargain-
ing Weights
In our baseline estimation, we fix the value of the surplus division parameter α at 0.5.
In this section, we re-estimate the model with different values of α in order to assess
the sensitivity of our parameter estimates as well as the estimated model’s equilibrium
labor market properties to the value of this parameter.
The results from our sensitivity analysis confirm that investment in the two different
types of human capital strongly depend on the worker’s surplus share α. In Table A2,
we see that total investment in θ (τθ) decreases from 6.9 percent to 3.4 percent (as
proportion of total time) when α increases from 0.2 to 0.8. The baseline investment in
θ falls in between these values at 5.3 percent. On the other hand, the total investment
in worker ability a (τa) increases from 5.3 percent to 5.9 percent when α increases from
0.2 to 0.8. The baseline investment in worker ability also falls in between these values
at 5.6 percent.
The decrease in the total steady state level of match-specific training observed when
worker’s surplus share is increased reflects the differences between firms and workers
in their motives for general and specific training. The worker incorporates the impact
of general training on her lifetime productivity and any increase in his bargaining
position results in a larger weight on this benefit. On the other hand, the firm values
match-specific training also due to turnover concerns, since specific training increases
the expected duration of the match. With an increase in the worker’s bargaining
position, these turnover concerns get a much smaller weight in the bargaining problem.
Consequently, when α increases, the proportion of time devoted to general training
increases, while time devoted to match-specific training falls. The change in the steady
state distributions of general and match-specific human capital can also be seen in
Figure A1 and Figure A2.
Table A1 displays the parameter estimates for the three scenarios. The first column
displays the parameter estimates for the baseline, and the second and third columns
display the parameters for the models with α = 0.2 and α = 0.8. We see that the
parameter estimates are mostly similar between the three cases, with a few exceptions.
The largest differences are observed for the parameters that govern the technologies
for the rate of increase in general and specific human capital and the parameters for
the initial distributions of general ability which depend on schooling. Specifically, we
see that δˆ1a is −0.135 for the baseline, whereas it is −0.177 and 0.006 for the models
with α = 0.2 and α = 0.8, respectively. This is the parameter that governs the
state-dependence of general ability investment and the comparison of the estimates
between the three scenarios shows that it increases with the values of the surplus
division parameter α. In the baseline with α = 0.5, general training becomes less
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productive as a increases, whereas with α = 0.8, this negative state-dependence is
reversed and general training becomes more productive with increases in a. In other
words, in the baseline case, a is considerably more costly to change and consequently,
initial worker ability level is important for determining the human capital level of the
worker throughout his lifetime. However, in the estimated model with higher α, a is
relatively less costly to change and the role of initial endowments is diminished. This
seems to reflect the fact that worker’s ability to devote more time to general human
capital investment due to his larger surplus share also diminishes the role of schooling
in the model.
The parameters µa(e) control the distribution of starting values for general ability,
where e denotes the education level of the worker. Table A1 shows that we obtain larger
values for µa(e) when we reestimate the model with a larger α value. The estimated
model with α = 0.8 also exhibits lower initial observed wages with higher wage growth
rates, relative to the baseline. This is consistent with the above discussion regarding
the higher level of general human capital investment and the diminished role of initial
endowments that are observed due to the increased bargaining position of the worker.
A.1 Minimum Wage with Different Bargaining Weights
We also repeat our minimum wage policy experiment using the parameters estimated
with the different values of the Nash bargaining weight. The effects of the minimum
wage on unemployment, training and total output are almost identical to those using
the baseline parameters. However, we find slightly different effects on welfare driven by
the differences in the amount of general training provided under each set of estimates.
We recall that the benefits of general training flow mostly to the worker so that workers
receive more general training when their bargaining weight is higher. Also, as described
in the text, one of the welfare-reducing consequences of the minimum wage is the
reduction in general training. Putting these two facts together, we find that when the
worker has a low bargaining weight (α = 0.2), there is less general training to begin
with so that the effect of the minimum wage on training is smaller than in the baseline
model, as are the associated welfare losses. As a result, due to other the benefits of
minimum wage for the worker, the policy has an overall positive effect on welfare when
the worker’s bargaining weight is low. Similarly, when the worker’s bargaining weight
is high (α = 0.8), the effect of the minimum wage on training is larger and the welfare
losses are 2-3 times larger than in the baseline model.
B Deriving the Steady State Distribution in the Labor Market
In order to simplify notation, we first expand the space of match values to include
0, which signifies that the agent is unmatched, that is, unemployed. All employed
individuals at an arbitrary point in time are characterized by the labor market state
(j, k), which signifies aj and θk. Let the probability of (j, k) be denoted by pi(j, k). The
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steady state marginal distributions of a and θ are given by pia(j) and piθ(k), respectively.
There are J possible values of a, and K possible values of θ (for employed agents), with
0 < a1 < ... < aJ
0 < θ1 < ... < θK .
From our estimates, we have determined the minimal value of θ that is acceptable when
an agent characterized by aj is in the unemployment state, which we denote by k(j)
(that is, θk(j) is the minimal acceptable match value to an individual with ability level
aj). We define the indicator variable
d(j, k) =
{
1 if k ≥ k(j)
0 if k < k(j)
, j = 1, ..., J ; k = 1, ...,K.
Tautologically, pi(j, k) = 0 for all (j, k) such that d(j, k) = 0, j = 1, ..., J, k = 1, ...,K.
Unemployed agents of type aj occupy the state (j, 0), with the probability of a type
j individual being unemployed given by pi(j, 0). Then we have
pia(j) = pi(j, 0) +
∑
k>0
pi(j, k)
is the marginal distribution of a in the population. The conditional probability that a
type j individual is unemployed is U(i) = pi(j, 0)/pia(j).
We begin by considering movements in the probability of being unemployed for an
agent of ability type j. We have
·
pi(j, 0) = η
∑
k>0
pi(j, k)
+δ˜a(j + 1)[
∑
k>0
pi(j + 1, k)(1− d(j, k))]
+
∑
k>0
δ˜θ(k)pi(j, k)(1− d(j, k − 1))
−λUpi(j, 0)
∑
k>0
pθ(k)d(j, k).
The right hand side terms correspond to the following events. On the first line is the
rate at which jobs of any acceptable type (all k for which d(j, k) = 1) are destroyed
times the probability that type j individuals are employed. The second line represents
inflows in to the unemployment state that result from depreciation in general skills
that are associated with “endogenous” quits into unemployment. In this case, an
individual employed with skills (j + 1, k) will quit into unemployment if they would
not accept employment at (j, k). The third line represents inflows into unemployment
from individuals with skills (j, k) when their match skill level depreciates to k− 1 and
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(j, k−1) is not an acceptable match. The last line is the outflow from the unemployment
state, which is the the product of the rate of receiving job offers in the unemployed
state, the probability of being in the state (j, 0), and the probability of receiving an
acceptable job offer. Then, in the steady state,
pi∗(j, 0) = [λU
∑
k>0
pθ(k)]
−1
×{η
∑
k>0
pi∗(j, k)
+δ˜a(j + 1)[
∑
k>0
pi∗(j + 1, k)(1− d(j, k))]
+
∑
k>0
δ˜θ(k)pi(j, k)(1− d(j, k − 1))}, (5)
for j = 1, ..., J.
Now consider the determination of the probabilities associated with employment,
those for which k > 0. The generic expression for the time derivative of pi(j, k) is
·
pi(j, k) = pi(j − 1, k)ϕa(j − 1, k) + pi(j, k − 1)ϕθ(j, k − 1)
+δ˜a(j + 1)pi(j + 1, k) + δ˜θ(k + 1)pi(j, k + 1)
+λUpi(j, 0)pθ(j) + λE
∑
l<k
pi(j, l)
−[η + δ˜a(j) + δ˜θ(k) + λE
∑
l>k
pi(j, l)]pi(j, k).
In terms of the expressions on the right hand side of this equation, the first line rep-
resents improvements resulting in attaining state (j, k) from the states (j − 1, k) and
(j, k − 1). The second line represents inflows from human capital depreciations from
the states (j+1, k) and (j, k+1). The third lines represent inflows from the unemploy-
ment state and from contacts with other employed individuals of ability type j who
are currently working at jobs in which there match value is less than k. The final line
represents all of the ways in which individuals from (j, k) exit the state. These are
the exogenous dismissals, decreases in j or k, or finding another job for which match
productivity is greater than k. Then in the steady state we have
pi∗(j, k) = [η + δ˜a(j) + δ˜θ(k) + λE
∑
l>k
pi∗(j, l)]−1
×{ϕa(j − 1, k)pi∗(j − 1, k) + ϕθ(j, k − 1)pi∗(j, k − 1)
+δ˜a(j + 1)pi
∗(j + 1, k) + δ˜θ(k + 1)pi∗(j, k + 1)
+λUpi
∗(j, 0)pθ(k) + λE
∑
l<k
pi∗(j, l)},
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for j = 1, ..., J, k = 1, ...,K.
We can vectorize the pi matrix, and define the column vector
Π =

pi(1, ·)
pi(2, ·)
...
pi(J, ·)
 ,
where pi(j, ·) = (pi(j, 0) pi(j, 1) ... pi(j,K))′. Some elements of this vector are identically
equally to 0, those for which d(j, k) = 0. Let the number of nonzero elements of Π be
denoted N(Π), where N(Π) ≤ J × (K + 1). Denote the entire system of equations by
D(Π). Then we seek
Π∗ = D(Π∗).
With no on-the-job search, this mapping is monotone on a compact space, and
hence the solution is unique. With on-the-job search, it is clear that an equilibrium
always exists, although we have not yet proven uniqueness. Simulations of the model
and computation of the fixed point have consistently agreed, however, so that we are
confident in the uniqueness property.
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Table 1: Proportion of Job Spells by the number of interview dates they span
High School Graduates Some College College Graduates
0 61% 55% 53%
1 23% 24% 21%
2 7% 9% 11%
3 3% 4% 6%
4 2% 3% 3%
5 1% 2% 3%
6 3% 3% 3%
Table 2: Incidence of Training
Some College
All HS College or More
% who got training at least once 15% 18 % 13 % 13%
% who got training at the start of job spell 6% 10 % 5 % 3%
Table 3: Proportion by Number of Training Spells (Conditional on Having Participated
At Least Once)
Percentage over All Workers with at Least One Training Spell
1 72 %
2 18 %
3 6 %
4 3 %
5 1 %
51
Table 4: Annual Labor Turnover Rates and Wage Growth
Some College
HS College or More
Panel A: Employment-to-Employment (EE) transitions btw t− 1 and t % of EE transitions with no job change 81 %
% of EE transitions with no job change 81 % 85 % 88%
% of EE transitions with job change (job-to-job transitions) 19 % 15 % 12%
..... % of job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t 4 % 3% 2%
..... % of job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t 15% 12% 10%
Panel B: Wage Growth btw t− 1 and t EE transitions with no job change 0.08
EE transitions with no job change 0.08 0.08 0.09
EE transitions with job change (job-to-job transitions) 0.11 0.15 0.20
..... job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t 0.06 0.06 0.23
..... job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t 0.12 0.17 0.20
Panel C: % of Negative Wage Growth btw t− 1 and t EE transitions with no job change 17 %
EE transitions with no job change 17 % 19 % 23%
EE transitions with job change 32 % 32 % 28%
..... job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t 40 % 47% 27%
..... job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t 30% 28% 28%
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Table 5: Log Wage Difference btw Interview Dates t− 1 and t by Training
logwt − logwt−1
No Training Got Training
transitions with no job change 0.08 0.08
transitions with job change (job-to-job transitions) 0.14 0.10
job-to-job transitions with non-employment spell btw t− 1 and t 0.08 0.15
job-to-job transitions with no non-employment spell btw t− 1 and t 0.15 0.09
Table 6: Parameter Estimates
PARAMETERS FOR EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS
flow value of unemployment b 6.471 (0.857)
job offer rate - unemployed λu 0.138 (0.019)
job offer rate - employed λe 0.069 (0.023)
exogenous job separation rate η .004 (0.001)
PARAMETERS OF INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS
General ability investment TFP δ0a 0.029 (0.005)
Firm-specific investment TFP δ0θ 0.023 (0.003)
State-dependence of general ability investment δ1a -0.135 (0.144)
State-dependence of firm-specific investment δ1θ 0.577 (0.098)
Curvature of general ability investment δ2a 0.283 (0.084)
Curvature of firm-specific investment δ2θ 0.443 (0.062)
Rate of decrease in general ability ϕ˜−a 0.001 (0.0003)
Rate of decrease in match quality ϕ˜−θ 0.011 (.003)
PARAMETERS OF INITIAL ABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
Mean of initial general ability - High School µa(ei = 1) 0.884 (0.159)
Mean of initial general ability - Some College µa(ei = 2) 1.152 (0.112)
Mean of initial general ability - BA or higher µa(ei = 3) 1.449 (0.083)
Variance of initial general ability σa .204 (.086)
PARAMETERS OF JOB OFFERS
Mean of match quality distribution µθ 1.408 (0.040)
Variance of match quality distribution σθ 0.289 (0.034)
PARAMETERS GOVERNING TRAINING OBSERVATION
Intercept for training observation β0 -2.633 (0.039)
Coefficient on τ for training observation β1 1.0000 -
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Table 7: Model Fit: Incidence of Training
Some College
All HS College or More
% who got training at least once
........ Data 15% 18 % 13 % 13%
........ Model 17% 21 % 16 % 12%
% who got training at the start of job spell
........ Data 6% 10 % 5 % 3%
........ Model 5% 6 % 4 % 3%
Figure 1: Model Fit: Log Wage Distribution - Year 0-2
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Figure 2: Model Fit: Log Wage Distribution - Year 3-5
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Figure 3: Model Fit: Log Wage Distribution - Year 6-8
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Table 8: Model Fit: Annual Labor Turnover Rates and Wage Growth
Some College
HS College or More
Panel A: Employment-to-Employment (EE) transitions btw t− 1 and t
% of EE transitions with no job change
........ Data 81 % 85 % 88%
....... Model 74% 74 % 76%
% of EE transitions with job change (job-to-job transitions)
........ Data 19 % 15 % 12%
....... Model 25 % 26 % 24%
% of job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Data 4 % 3% 2%
....... Model 8 % 8% 8%
% of job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Data 15% 12% 10%
....... Model 17% 17% 16%
Panel B: Wage Growth btw t− 1 and t
EE transitions with no job change
....... Data 0.08 0.08 0.09
....... Model 0.08 0.08 0.08
EE transitions with job change
....... Data 0.11 0.15 0.20
....... Model 0.09 0.11 0.11
job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Data 0.06 0.06 0.23
....... Model -0.10 -0.06 -0.02
job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Data 0.12 0.17 0.20
....... Model 0.18 0.19 0.17
Panel C: % of Negative Wage Growth btw t− 1 and t
EE transitions with no job change
....... Data 17 % 19 % 23%
....... Model 38 % 37 % 37%
EE transitions with job change
....... Data 32% 32% 28%
....... Model 37% 35% 34%
job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Data 40 % 47% 27%
....... Model 61 % 57% 50%
job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Data 30% 28% 28%
....... Model 26% 24% 26%
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Table 9: Parameter Estimates: Baseline vs. Constrained Estimations with No a/No θ
Baseline No a No θ
PARAMETERS FOR EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS
flow value of unemployment b 6.4705 4.2083 7.1923
job offer rate - unemployed λu 0.1375 0.1416 0.2040
job offer rate - employed λe 0.0685 0.0823 0.0823
exogenous job separation rate η 0.0036 0.0026 0.0026
PARAMETERS OF INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS
General ability investment TFP δ0a 0.0285 0.0 0.0372
Firm-specific investment TFP δ0θ 0.0229 0.0225 0.0
State-dependence of general ability investment δ1a -0.1353 -0.1353 -0.0304
State-dependence of firm-specific investment δ1θ 0.4426 0.6586 0.5767
Curvature of general ability investment δ2a 0.2826 0.2826 0.1459
Curvature of firm-specific investment δ2θ 0.4426 0.6561 0.4426
Rate of decrease in general ability ϕ˜−a 0.0014 0.0014 0.0036
Rate of decrease in match quality ϕ˜−θ 0.0113 0.0195 0.0016
PARAMETERS OF INITIAL ABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
Mean of initial general ability - High School µa(ei = 1) 0.8844 0.8621 0.9117
Mean of initial general ability - Some College µa(ei = 2) 1.1515 1.0546 1.2009
Mean of initial general ability - BA or higher µa(ei = 3) 1.4489 1.3429 1.4695
Variance of initial general ability σa 0.2041 0.1355 0.1992
PARAMETERS OF JOB OFFERS
Mean of match quality distribution µθ 1.4078 1.3900 1.2990
Variance of match quality distribution σθ 0.2895 0.3757 0.2400
PARAMETERS GOVERNING TRAINING OBSERVATION
Intercept for training observation β0 -2.7331 -2.8469 -2.6084
Coefficient on τ for training observation βa 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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Table 10: Simulations: Baseline vs. Estimations with No a/No θ
Annual Labor Turnover Rates and Wage Growth
Some College
HS College or More
Panel A: Employment-to-Employment (EE) transitions btw t− 1 and t
% of EE transitions with no job change
....... Baseline 74% 74 % 76%
....... No a 84 % 82 % 81%
....... No θ 70 % 70 % 72%
% of EE transitions with job change (job-to-job transitions)
....... Baseline 25 % 26 % 24%
....... No a 16 % 18 % 19%
....... No θ 30 % 30 % 27%
% of job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Baseline 8 % 8% 8%
....... No a 7 % 7 % 7%
....... No θ 6% 7 % 7%
% of job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Baseline 17% 17% 16%
....... No a 9% 11% 12%
....... No θ 23% 23% 21%
Panel B: Wage Growth btw t− 1 and t
EE transitions with no job change
....... Baseline 0.08 0.08 0.08
....... No a 0.06 0.07 0.08
....... No θ 0.07 0.07 0.06
EE transitions with job change
....... Baseline 0.09 0.11 0.11
....... No a -0.03 -0.002 0.02
....... No θ 0.15 0.15 0.15
job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Baseline -0.10 -0.06 -0.02
....... No a -0.17 -0.13 -0.09
....... No θ -0.02 0.02 0.08
job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Baseline 0.18 0.19 0.17
....... No a 0.07 0.07 0.09
....... No θ 0.19 0.19 0.18
Panel C: % of Negative Wage Growth btw t− 1 and t
EE transitions with no job change
....... Baseline 38 % 37 % 37%
....... No a 43% 41% 40%
....... No θ 39% 39% 41%
EE transitions with job change
....... Baseline 37% 35% 34%
....... No a 54% 51% 49%
....... No θ 29% 28% 27%
job-to-job transitions with non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Baseline 61 % 57% 50%
....... No a 69% 63% 61%
....... No θ 53% 48% 41%
job-to-job transitions with no non-employment btw t− 1 and t
....... Baseline 26% 24% 26%
....... No a 44% 44% 42%
....... No θ 23% 22% 23%59
Figure 4: Avg. Log Wages by Tenure
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Figure 5: Minimum Acceptable Match-Quality
This figure shows the θ∗(a), the lowest match quality that workers with each level of general ability will accept.
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Figure 6: Trade-Off between Wages and Training in Bargaining Problem
This figure shows combinations of general training (τa), match specific training (τθ) and wages that solve the bargaining problem
between the worker and the firm at the median values of a and θ. Lines on the graph show combinations of τa and τθ along
which the negotiated wage remains constant. The blue dot shows the surplus maximizing combination, which is the model
solution for τa and τθ.
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Figure 7: General Training
This figure shows the amount of general training that workers receive at different combinations on a and θ. Lines on the graph
show contours along which the amount of training remains constant. The blank area below the black line, shows states for
which workers will not accept the job offer.
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Figure 8: Match-Specific Training
This figure shows the amount of match-specific training that wokers receive at different combinations on a and θ. Lines on the
graph show contours along which the amount of training remains constant. The blank area below the black line, shows states
for which workers will not accept the job offer.
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Figure 9: Wage as Fraction of Output
This figure shows the worker’s wage as a fraction of his total output at different combinations on a and θ. Lines on the graph
show contours along which the fraction remains constant. The blank area below the black line, shows states for which workers
will not accept the job offer.
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.850.850.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.8
5
0.9 0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.95 0
.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.9
5
0.
98
0.
98
0.9
8
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1.05
Lo
g 
M
at
ch
 V
al
ue
Log Worker Ability
Wage as Fraction of Output
0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
65
Figure 10: Training by Years in Labor Market
This figure shows the average fraction of their time that workers spend on general and match-specific training in the model
simulation as a function of the number of years in the labor market.
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 T
im
e
0 2 4 6 8
Years
Total Training General Training
Match−Specific Training
Training by Years in Labor Force
66
Figure 11: Sources of Wage Growth by Years in Labor Market
This figure shows the average of the log of general human capital, the amount of match-specific capital accumulated through
search and through training, the log of the fraction of time they spend not training, and the log of the average wage as a fraction
of worker output for simulated workers as a function of the number of years in the labor market. In the absence of employment
costs, these five components would add up to the total log wage, which is also shown.
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Table 11: Mincer Regressions
Const Some College BA Years in LF Tenure
DATA
log wage 2.141 0.316 0.796 0.051 0.045
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.002) (0.003)
MODEL
log wage 2.390 0.260 0.594 0.047 0.055
starting a .902 0.239 0.537 -0.000 0.002
a from training 0.037 -0.015 -0.031 0.037 0.004
θ from search 1.789 0.010 0.029 0.008 0.013
θ from training 0.017 0.005 0.007 -0.000 0.038
hours worked -0.315 0.017 0.044 0.004 0.016
wage/output -0.040 0.003 0.008 -0.001 -0.017
Table 12: Mincer Regressions by Education
Constant Years in LF Tenure
HS College BA HS College BA HS College BA
DATA
log wage 2.305 2.667 2.951 0.069 0.039 0.044 0.033 0.052 0.053
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
MODEL
log wage 2.390 2.645 2.990 0.048 0.047 0.042 0.053 0.058 0.060
starting a 0.902 1.139 1.440 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002
a from training 0.029 0.027 0.021 0.038 0.035 0.031 0.003 0.004 0.006
θ from search 1.794 1.796 1.813 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.011
θ from training 0.023 0.018 0.014 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.035 0.041 0.045
hours worked -0.314 -0.299 -0.273 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.016 0.015 0.016
wage/output -0.044 -0.035 -0.026 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016 -0.017 -0.020
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Figure 12: Mininimum Acceptable Wage with Minimum Wage
This figure shows the θ∗(a), the lowest match quality that workers with each level of general ability will accept. The solid line
shows θ∗(a) for the baseline model, the dashed line when we impose a minimum wage.
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Figure 13: Training by Years in Labor Market with Minimum Wage
This figure shows the average fraction of their time that workers spend on general and match specific training in the model
simulation as a function of the number of years in the labor market. The solid lines show the amount of training in the baseline
model. The corresponding dashed lines show the amount of training when we impose a minimum wage.
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Figure 14: Log Wage Distribution by Years in Labor Market with Minimum Wage
This figure shows the distribution of log wages in the model simulation as a function of the number of years in the labor
market. The solid lines show percentiles of the distribution in the baseline model. The corresponding dashed lines show the
same percentiles when we impose a minimum wage.
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Table A1: Sensitivity Analysis with Different α Values
Baseline (α = 0.5) α = 0.2 α = 0.8
PARAMETERS FOR EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS
flow value of unemployment b 6.471 7.069 6.816
job offer rate - unemployed λu 0.138 0.143 0.141
job offer rate - employed λe 0.069 0.059 0.061
exogenous job separation rate η 0.004 0.004 0.004
PARAMETERS OF INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS
General ability investment TFP δ0a 0.029 0.029 0.027
Firm-specific investment TFP δ0θ 0.023 0.023 0.024
State-dependence of general ability investment δ1a -0.135 -0.177 0.006
State-dependence of firm-specific investment δ1θ 0.443 0.593 0.542
Curvature of general ability investment δ2a 0.283 0.263 0.278
Curvature of firm-specific investment δ2θ 0.443 0.463 0.392
Rate of decrease in general ability ϕ˜−a 0.001 0.001 0.001
Rate of decrease in match quality ϕ˜−θ 0.011 0.010 0.011
PARAMETERS OF INITIAL ABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
Mean of initial general ability - High School µa(ei = 1) 0.884 0.921 0.745
Mean of initial general ability - Some College µa(ei = 2) 1.152 1.184 1.099
Mean of initial general ability - BA or higher µa(ei = 3) 1.449 1.445 1.383
Variance of initial general ability σa 0.204 0.254 0.219
PARAMETERS OF JOB OFFERS
Mean of match quality distribution µθ 1.408 1.439 1.446
Variance of match quality distribution σθ 0.289 0.303 0.270
PARAMETERS GOVERNING TRAINING OBSERVATION
Intercept for training observation β0 -2.733 -2.777 -2.713
Coefficient on τ for training observation βa 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Table A2: Sensitivity Analysis: Steady State
Baseline (α = 0.5) α = 0.2 α = 0.8
Unemployment Rate (%) 19.54 19.47 27.67
Average Log Worker Ability 1.91 1.98 1.91
Total Investment in Worker Ability (%) 5.56 5.25 5.98
Total Theta Investment (%) 5.28 6.99 3.40
Total Output 41.71 47.94 36.87
Mean Log Wage 3.71 3.75 3.73
Mean Productivity 57.73 67.08 56.17
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Figure A1: Sensitivity Analysis: Steady State Distributions - Log Match Values
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Figure A2: Sensitivity Analysis: Steady State Distributions - Log Match Values
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